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On a more abstract level populism is a paradigmatic fight: It pitches person against institution. A populist's legitimation is essentially that he or she is popular. Meaningful, realistical political programs are largely absent and replaced by trust in the leader. This is in stark contrast to non-poupulist parties and camps which usually come with an agenda and whose members gain their legitimation from being voted into an office. It is telling that Putin's influence was largely independent of the actual office he was holding (President or Prime Minister).

Most people would also argue that on average, in the long run, working democratic institutions yield better results in terms of general well-being than policies devised by a populist leader and his family and cronies.

On a more abstract level, populism is a paradigmatic fight: It pitches person against institution. A populist's legitimacy is essentially that he or she is popular. Meaningful, realistic political programs are largely absent and replaced by trust in the leader. This is in stark contrast to non-populist parties and camps which usually come with an agenda and whose members gain their legitimacy to fulfill a political function by being voted into the specific office with that function. It is telling that Putin's influence was largely independent of the actual office he was holding (President or Prime Minister).¹

Most people would also argue that on average, in the long run, working democratic institutions yield better results in terms of general well-being than policies devised by a populist leader and his family and cronies.

_{¹There is a classic litmus test in political science whether a regime is a democracy or not: Is a change in leadership a systemic crisis? The reason is that in a democracy, even the elected leaders are, essentially, functionaries. That is what assassins often misunderstand about democracies: Killing, say, the President is terrible and sad but will usually not threaten the democracy: The assassination betrays a fundamental misunderstanding because the function of President, the political system, was not even attacked. Succession is regulated and, while not exactly routine, easily performed: His or her replacement will step in or will be voted in. By contrast, a regime that is focused on a person (North Korea, obviously, or Russia) relies on that specific person; a change in leadership is a crisis of the system which depends on him or her.}

Through a long evolution we have arrived at institutions which — despite superficial appearance, sometimes — work as well as any seasoned marriage. In other words, largely unremarkable, and therein lies a danger (for the marriage and the institutions).

Most people would also argue that on average, in the long run, working democratic institutions yield better results than policies devised by a populist leader and his family and cronies.

Through a long evolution we have arrived at institutions which — despite superficial appearance, sometimes — work as well as any seasoned marriage. In other words: largely unremarkably, and therein lies a danger (for the marriage and the institutions).

Most people would also argue that on average, in the long run, working democratic institutions yield better results in terms of general well-being than policies devised by a populist leader and his family and cronies.

One would think that the people eventually see through that betrayal and throw them out; but there is a mechanism of populist self-preservation which makes some of them surprisingly persistent in office. The populist leaders rely not so much on fellow politicians, other influential people or the political institutions but rather on elections and plebiscites. Their popularity is their main political capital. Elections can be won initially because the populist appears as the only candidate who takes the common people seriously. Once in power, the leader can then use the people's backing to weaken the institutions, rules and mechanisms which keep the democracy alive. They all have a common purpose: To curb the leader's power. Weakening them reduces these checks. This can currently be observed in places like Hungary, Turkey, and perhaps the U.S. Usually the judiciary is weakened, the independent press is intimidated or outright persecuted, political friends rewarded and foes reprimanded.

The result is a situation which makes a correction hard. The common people hear what they are supposed to hear from the streamlined or simply owned media and thus continue favoring the controlling leader. The emaciated judiciary is unable to prevent or prosecute executive transgression and corruption. The weakened opposition is unable to use the weakened institutions to correct the course from within the government, or to alert the people. Many adverse effects of populist policies, like increasing the national debt in favor of consumptive spending, are long-term enough to become a problem only for their successors.

Some of these strategies are, of course, not unique to populists, but they have greater leverage in rule-violating and attacking the institutions because they enjoy the backing of the public opinion.

David Frum has written an article about Donald Trump in The Atlantic which has become popular quickly. It covers some of the topics I touched.

One would think that the people eventually see through that betrayal and throw them out; but there is a mechanism of populist self-preservation which makes some of them surprisingly persistent in office. The populist leaders rely not so much on political alliances, other influential people or the political institutions but rather on elections and plebiscites. Their popularity is their main political capital. Elections can be won initially because the populist appears as the only candidate who takes the common people seriously. Once in power, the leader can then use the people's backing to weaken the institutions, rules and mechanisms which keep the democracy alive.

Essential institutions include:

• Free, valid elections.
• Independent courts.
• Independent media, especially mass media.

Essential rules include:

• Time and repetition limits on terms.
• Constitutional limits of authority.
• Enforced rules against bribery and cronyism.

They all have a common purpose: To limit the leader's power. Weakening these checks leads to greater power of the political leader, which in turn can be used to further weaken the institutions. This can currently be observed in places like Hungary, Turkey and Poland; Berlusconi in Italy used such strategies as well. David Frum has written an article about Donald Trump in The Atlantic which has become, well, popular quickly. It covers some of the topics I touched.

The common theme is that the judiciary is weakened, media influence is gained by ownership, intimidation or outright persecution, political friends are rewarded and foes are reprimanded.

The result is a situation which makes a correction hard. The common people receive biased information from streamlined or simply owned media and thus continue favoring the controlling leader. The emaciated judiciary is unable to prevent or prosecute executive transgression and corruption. The weakened opposition is unable to use the weakened institutions to correct the course from within the government, or to alert the people. Many adverse effects of populist policies, like increasing the national debt in favor of consumptive spending, are long-term enough to become a problem only for their successors.

Some of these strategies are, of course, not unique to populists, but populists have greater leverage in rule-violating and attacking the institutions because they enjoy the backing of the public opinion.

On a more abstract level populism is a paradigmatic fight: It pitches person against institution. A populist's legitimation is essentially that he or she is popular. Meaningful, realistical political programs are largely absent and replaced by trust in the leader. This is in stark contrast to non-poupulist parties and camps which usually come with an agenda and whose members gain their legitimation from being voted into an office. It is telling that Putin's influence was largely independent of the actual office he was holding (President or Prime Minister).

This paradigmatic contrast provides the key to understanding the bad reputation of populism. Everything that is good about democratic institutions and procedures makes populism, which despises and rejects or bypasses them, bad.

Through a long evolution we have arrived at institutions which — despite superficial appearance, sometimes — work as well as any seasoned marriage. In other words, largely unremarkable, and therein lies a danger (for the marriage and the institutions).

The occasional bickering shouldn't distract from the two key benefits of a democracy:

• They make our lives safer.
• They give us essential freedoms.

Most people would also argue that on average, in the long run, working democratic institutions yield better results than policies devised by a populist leader and his family and cronies.