A recent commentary from The Sydney Morning Herald’s international editor, Peter Hartcher, described China (along with Islamic State and Russia) as “fascist,” sparking an angry response from China’s Foreign Ministry. Yet the piece likely sparked cheers among people with similar views. [...] But the logic behind this piece does not stand firm. [...]
Criticizing China for its political reality, developmental model, and “non-cooperative” behavior is easy, but seeing and truly understanding the differences and divergences between civilizations is far more difficult — so much so that quite often people choose not to even try. Instead, they import a Western concept (in this case, fascism) to try and conceptualize a non-Western system.
Now, is China centralized? In general, yes — but how centralized? Actually, China is far less centralized than many outside observers assume. To cite one example: for years, fiscal decentralization between the central government and local provinces has played a critical role in the unbalanced flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the Chinese market. This decentralization has had several readily observable consequences, including different levels of economic growth and green development among the various regions. In his 2012 book, Pierre F. Landry described China’s political system as “decentralized authoritarianism.”
As for the final point, the nation (and the family) has a uniquely important role in China’s contemporary political philosophy. But this is not new, much less an invention of the current regime. Reverence for authority, emphasis on leaders’ moral quality, and collectivism have all been rooted in China’s political culture for thousands of years and these concepts have had natural and inevitable impacts on contemporary Chinese politics. Yet somehow this has made China unpopular in the eyes of the West and some Western media.
China Labour Bulletin, an advocacy group in Hong Kong that tracks protests, recorded at least 1,700 labor disputes last year, up from about 1,200 the year before. Those figures represent only a fraction of disputes across China, since many conflicts go unreported and Mr. Xi has intensified censorship. [...]
As protests have multiplied, Mr. Xi, China’s most powerful leader since Mao, has sought to reassure workers that he understands their plight. [...]
Labor protests in China are common, and to avoid protracted conflicts, local officials often put pressure on businesses to settle disputes. But companies may be more unwilling — or unable — to do so now as they struggle to find money. [...]
Mr. Xi has expanded the party’s oversight of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the party-controlled organ that is supposed to mediate disputes for its more than 300 million members but often sides with management. He has also dismantled nonprofit labor advocacy groups, which in the past provided advice to workers and helped with collective bargaining.
In a crackdown in Shenzhen in late January, the authorities detained five veteran labor rights advocates and accused them of “disturbing public order,” a vague charge the party often uses against its critics. [...]
Despite the restrictions, activists have had some success in organizing protests across provincial lines, often with the help of social media. Crane operators across China coordinated a Labor Day strike last year that involved tens of thousands of workers from at least 10 provinces.
[...] Mr. Xi has particularly sought to suppress a resurgence of labor activism on college campuses, including a high-profile campaign for workers’ rights led by young communists at elite universities.
The activists have used the teachings of Mao and Marx to argue that China’s embrace of capitalism has exploited workers. Last summer, they tried to help workers in southern China organize an independent labor union, saying that corrupt local officials were colluding with managers to abuse workers.
The authorities have repeatedly tried to quash the protests, leading to the disappearances and detentions of more than 50 people associated with the campaign.
The authorities have responded so forcefully to the young communists in part because their demands are ideological, not material, said Professor Fu, who has studied unrest in China.
“To the government, calling out the party for not being Marxist is like children openly denouncing their birth parents,” she said. “It is seen as outright defiance and rejection of the state-led socialism.”
