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ohwilleke
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It was a risky move. The Democrats in the U.S. House basically forced the opposition to either disavow democracy which would disrespect the voters members of Congress will themselves be appealing to in a month and a half, or to take a vote that discredits and rebukes their own Presidential nominee in the same election. If Republicans in the U.S. House had backed the President as the five dissenters did, the vote would have set the stage for a likely self-coup attempt if Trump does not win the election.

This gambit was successful. Trump's extra-legal rhetoric was publicly rebuffed and rejected by all but about 5 members of his own caucus in the U.S. House out of 185. The measure was adopted in a bipartisan 397-5 vote. (A U.S. Senate vote on a substantially similar resolution, held September 24, 2020 was unanimous.)

It was a risky move. The Democrats in the U.S. House basically forced the opposition to either disavow democracy which would disrespect the voters members of Congress will themselves be appealing to in a month and a half, or to take a vote that discredits and rebukes their own Presidential nominee in the same election.

This gambit was successful. Trump's extra-legal rhetoric was publicly rebuffed and rejected by all but about 5 members of his own caucus in the U.S. House out of 185.

It was a risky move. The Democrats in the U.S. House basically forced the opposition to either disavow democracy which would disrespect the voters members of Congress will themselves be appealing to in a month and a half, or to take a vote that discredits and rebukes their own Presidential nominee in the same election. If Republicans in the U.S. House had backed the President as the five dissenters did, the vote would have set the stage for a likely self-coup attempt if Trump does not win the election.

This gambit was successful. Trump's extra-legal rhetoric was publicly rebuffed and rejected by all but about 5 members of his own caucus in the U.S. House. The measure was adopted in a bipartisan 397-5 vote. (A U.S. Senate vote on a substantially similar resolution, held September 24, 2020 was unanimous.)

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ohwilleke
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In the factface of repeated threats by the incumbent President to violate the law and not peacefully transfer power, the mere fact that the law says that someone is supposed to do something is besides the point. Judges simply have pieces of paper that the appropriate officials almost always listen to voluntarily.

In the fact of repeated threats by the incumbent President to violate the law and not peacefully transfer power, the mere fact that the law says that someone is supposed to do something is besides the point. Judges simply have pieces of paper that the appropriate officials almost always listen to voluntarily.

In the face of repeated threats by the incumbent President to violate the law and not peacefully transfer power, the mere fact that the law says that someone is supposed to do something is besides the point. Judges simply have pieces of paper that the appropriate officials almost always listen to voluntarily.

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ohwilleke
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It was a risky move. The Democrats in the U.S. House basically forced the opposition to either disavow democracy which would disrespect the voters members of Congress will themselves be appealing to in a month and a half, or to take a vote that discredits and rebukes their own Presidential nominee in the same election.

This gambit was successful. Trump's extra-legal rhetoric was publicly rebuffed and rejected by all but about 5 members of his own caucus in the U.S. House out of 185.

A collective strategy of securing public pre-dispute commitments to not support the actions that the incumbent President has threatened to take gives everyone whose loyalties may be tested when a transition dispute arises confidence about which side will prevail in that dispute, because the worst outcome for any senior official or politician in a constitutional crisis is to appear to be a traitor to the political winner of the dispute. So its critical to influence the worst outcome for any senior official or politicianperception of who will win the dispute in a constitutional crisis is to appear to be a traitorthe face of what amounts to gaslighting by the President over whether basic shared political winnernorms like a peaceful transition of the disputepower are still in place. If it is manifestly clear to the incumbent President that he has no support from members of Congress from his own party, the military, or the rank and file in the Justice Department, for his plan, his incentive to never carry out the threat is much stronger.

This was successful. Trump's extra-legal rhetoric was publicly rebuffed and rejected by all but about 5 members of his own caucus in the U.S. House out of 185.

A collective strategy of securing public pre-dispute commitments to not support the actions that the incumbent President has threatened to take gives everyone whose loyalties may be tested when a transition dispute arises confidence about which side will prevail in that dispute, because the worst outcome for any senior official or politician in a constitutional crisis is to appear to be a traitor to the political winner of the dispute. If it is manifestly clear to the incumbent President that he has no support from members of Congress from his own party, the military, or the rank and file in the Justice Department, for his plan, his incentive to never carry out the threat is much stronger.

It was a risky move. The Democrats in the U.S. House basically forced the opposition to either disavow democracy which would disrespect the voters members of Congress will themselves be appealing to in a month and a half, or to take a vote that discredits and rebukes their own Presidential nominee in the same election.

This gambit was successful. Trump's extra-legal rhetoric was publicly rebuffed and rejected by all but about 5 members of his own caucus in the U.S. House out of 185.

A collective strategy of securing public pre-dispute commitments to not support the actions that the incumbent President has threatened to take gives everyone whose loyalties may be tested when a transition dispute arises confidence about which side will prevail in that dispute, because the worst outcome for any senior official or politician in a constitutional crisis is to appear to be a traitor to the political winner of the dispute. So its critical to influence the perception of who will win the dispute in the face of what amounts to gaslighting by the President over whether basic shared political norms like a peaceful transition of power are still in place. If it is manifestly clear to the incumbent President that he has no support from members of Congress from his own party, the military, or the rank and file in the Justice Department, for his plan, his incentive to never carry out the threat is much stronger.

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ohwilleke
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ohwilleke
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