What"What is NetaniyahuNetanyahu betting on?"
HeNetanyahu is betting on theunwavering support of thefrom Zionist lobbies in Western nations, particularly in the WestUnited States.
It is unlikely that Israel will face significant exhaustion, at least in the shortimmediate term, as long asgiven the strong backing from the United States and its allied partners continue to provide. As long as substantial political, military, and economic support continues to flow, Israel’s socio-economic resilience and military capabilities will remain intact.
Netanyahu appears to lack a definitive exit strategy, and frankly, he might not feelsee the necessity for one. Historical precedent suggests that leaders seldom face personal consequences for prolonged military conflicts ifonce they eventually step down. For example, noNo American president was ever held accountablefaced accountability for the Vietnam War, nor were George W. Bush or Tony Blair held responsible for the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions. The absence of repercussions means thatallows leaders like Netanyahu canto adopt a wait-and-see approach, letting timethe conflict drag on, fueling their while they consolidate political careers, and then retiring without significant consequencespower. This pattern suggests thatThus, maintaining the status quo mightappears to be his only plausible exit strategy, one in which he can rely on the inertia of ongoing support from key allies.
Another factor driving Netanyahu's lack of a clear exit strategy is his immediate political concerns. Domestic politics heavily influence his decisions—he must maintain an image of strength to placate his right-wing base and fend off opposition. Any concession or visible retreat risks weakening his political standing.
A full-scale, direct conflictWhen it comes to the possibility of a confrontation with Iran is something neither, both Israel norand Iran appears eagerappear to pursuehave no interest in pursuing a full-scale war. Iran, while assertive, has shown reluctance for a protracted, direct war against a superior U.S.-backed militarygenerally preferred indirect engagement, opting instead for asymmetrical means through regionaloften using proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon orand various militia groups inacross Iraq and Syria. Likewise, Israel, which faces substantial domestic and regional security concernson the other hand, is well aware of the dire costs associated with an all-outof direct conflict against Iran, particularly one involving Iran’s extensive military capabilities. InsteadTherefore, a large-scale confrontation is unlikely, with both sides will likely continue theirinstead relying on limited engagements—missile strikes, targeted attacks, and diplomatic posturing—while trying to avoid uncontrollable escalation.
For Israel, the immediate concern with Iran is not a direct invasion but rather the regional influence Tehran exercises through its proxy network. The pattern of limited, skirmishes—such as Israel's strikes against Iranian assets in Syria—suggests that Netanyahu's strategy is to continue weakening Iran’s regional infrastructure while maintaining the upper hand in the event of a tit-for-tat engagements—verbal threats, missile strikesexchange. This approach does not necessitate an "exit strategy" so much as a continuation of containment and deterrence, or targeted attacks—without escalating to full-scale warwith no defined endpoint.
An example is the skirmishesThe situation in SyriaLebanon also follows a similar logic. While Hezbollah remains a significant threat, whereit is one that Israel routinely targets Iranian positions and supply lines linked to Hezbollah without directly attacking Iran itselfbelieves can be contained through deterrence. The current strategy involves managing these hostilities to avoid uncontrollablehistorical precedent here is Israel’s 2006 war with Hezbollah, which, while costly, did not escalate into an unmanageable conflict. Netanyahu may be betting that any escalation with Hezbollah can similarly be contained without spiraling into a broader, as we have seen numerous times in recent yearsexistential confrontation.
The United States is unlikely to be willing or able to "contain"will likely avoid direct confrontation with Iran in the traditional, recognizing that containing Iran through military senseforce alone is both impractical and dangerous. Iran’s significant military capabilities, especiallyparticularly its influence through regional proxies in countries like Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, make it a formidable adversary in anya direct confrontation. The last time the U.S. previously attempted to confrontcounter Iran indirectly, it backedby backing Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, a conflict that eventuallywhich ended in a costly stalemate after eight years of devastating warfare. Since then, Iran has only grown stronger, bolstering bothexpanded its conventional military power and its regional influence, making direct confrontation an even less attractive option today.
Moreover, Gulf states that assistedpreviously supported the United States during the 1980s and 1990s are less likely to provide the same level of support nowin its confrontations with Iran have also changed their stance. The shifting power dynamics in the Middle East have led to a recognition among these nations ofto recognize Iran’s growing influence and military capabilities, prompting a more cautious approach. This is evidenced by theRecent diplomatic overturesengagements between Iran and the UAE or Saudi Arabia in recent years, culminating in talks facilitated by China, highlight the changing dynamics in the region and the desire among Gulf states to restore diplomatic relationsde-escalate tensions rather than align themselves with a U.S. military campaign.
The security ofAdditionally, U.S. bases inmilitary assets across Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar cannot be guaranteed in the event of a direct confrontation with Iran, as these facilities are well within the range of Iran’s missile arsenalcapabilities. The recentJanuary 2020 Iranian missile strikes on U.S. forces at the Ain al-Asad airbase in Iraq—carried outIraq, in response toretaliation for the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani—demonstratedSoleimani, demonstrated Iran’s capabilityability and willingness to target U.S. assets directly when provoked, even. The calculated nature of that response—intended to signal strength while carefully avoiding escalation to a broader warwar—illustrates how precarious any direct confrontation with Iran could be.