Why does regulation and legislation on technology take so long to pass?

Question

The presidential campaign of Andrew Yang shined a light on many of what it considered issues on modern practices of technology, data and the internet in today's society. Regarding 'Big Tech', data privacy and internet security, going as far to include even new developments such as blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies.

Yang called for the re-opening of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), a non-partisan government agency which was closed in 1995, way before the internet made its way in the majority of homes in the modern world.

Yet, why is the response, of the US and other governments, on regulating technology so slow? Given that the US Government is a monolith of military technological power and intelligence practices. Even though many experts and think-tanks have called for more regulation. Is it because the those at the federal level do not see it as a problem? Or are there other more covert reasons for not taking a stance.

Answer 1

In the best scenario, a government won't regulate an industry until there is a clear and distinct problem that requires regulation. First, a demonstrable public ill related to the activities of the industry must come into evidence. Second, the industry itself must show an inability or unwillingness to address that public ill. Then (and only then) will governments start considering enacting regulations. This is the same issue we have in all legal contexts. No one will write law proscribing behaviors that do not occur; no one can enforce law against crimes that haven't occurred. Someone must commit a murder for legislators to say "Hey, we shouldn't allow that!", and even after a legislature has created an anti-murder law, no one can be tried under it until they've at least attempted to break it.

Even though government tries to present itself as proactive, government is always ex post facto; it responds to what people or groups do when (and only when) people or groups do problematic things.

In more realistic scenarios, the kinds of people and groups who cause problems on scales we might want to write laws about — whether we're talking about 19th century industrialists, 20th century tobacco companies, or 21st century tech giants — are often socially and politically powerful in their own right, and can mount extensive campaigns against such regulation. Then we get into a typical political grind where those seeking regulation have to fight an uphill battle against other politicians whose vested interests lie with the industry (because, perhaps, the industry is a major donor, or a significant employer or revenue generator in their constituency) as well as against well-paid lobbyists and extensive public relations or disinformation campaigns generated from the industry itself. That necessarily takes time, money, and effort. The result is that needed regulations may be delayed years or decades until the tide of public opinion shifts enough to weaken opposition in political bodies.

Answer 2

One of the barriers I have observed in several legislative bodies, including the U.S. Congress, is an unexpected lack of faith in their own (legislators') competence to make sound judgements about "technology."

They frequently seem captured by jargon, and mermerized by minutiae, such that they take whatever the "experts" tell them and go with that.

This has allowed major tech companies to basically run the table on getting public policy rules and attitudes that favour them. The impact is rather dramatic. For example the entire discussion about competition law reform has been routed to arguments about controlling the search market or controlling the advertising market. It has been completely deflected from far more fundamental questions such as the infection of oligarhic structures in Western eonomies that stifles competition and throttles true inovation.

Just consider the role of the key cell phone players. If they were in the business of making houses how long do you think it would take for legislators to act if the house maker told homeowners they could only buy furniture from approved sellers? That they could only subscribe to electricity from an approved power vendor? That all of your activity in your home becomes the property of the house builder for purposes of "improving future houses, marketing, and improving our business." No one would stand for it.

Now apply that to the wide ranger of oligarchies in our economies. Amazon is both the "franchisor" and its own franchise actively selling against its victim-franchises. It provides a market place for a fee, effectively charging for the privilege of letting them take your customers. Cable and telco companies are not only carriers, they create and own content, and they actively put up barriers for other carriers to offer such content in any way that is not exactly in the interests of the carrier-content-owner.

This has been a problem in other industries but always it was pretty clearly a bought legislature. Today politicians often quite sincerely think the whole thing is over their own heads. I know this because I have dealt with a lot of them in varying capacities. One, in response to a Standing Committee investigation of Google's opposition to a Privacy Commissioner's findings, sponteously spouted, "Well, after all, privacy is really dead anyway isn't it?" Realizing he spoke out loud he leaned back in his green chair and gazed blankly at the ceiling.

@Ted Wrigley is large right, in my view, but I think it is more severe. The lack of informed thinking, willingness, or capacity to act by politicians is compounded by the active disinterest of voters. By this I mean their disinterest is much deeper than mere apathy. When told by their various providers that what they are getting is possibly threatened by a government initiative, the user-victims of the oligarchs will actually become intransigent about doing nothing. Kind of, "Why should I care as long as I can Facetime with my boy friend?"