5

In 2015, Iran agreed to a nuclear non-proliferation agreement in exchange for various sanctions to be lifted.

However, an apparently similar agreement was made with North Korea in 1994. President Bill Clinton commented on this:

US Will Be Safer Because of My North Korea Deal

Good afternoon. I am pleased that the United States and North Korea yesterday reached agreement on the text of a framework document on North Korea's nuclear program. This agreement will help to achieve a longstanding and vital American objective: an end to the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.

However, that objective was not reached. North Korea did test a nuclear warhead in 2006 and then proceeded with further steps of nuclear proliferation.

How do the contents of these two agreements and the internal and external circumstances of Iran and North-Korea differ to make the JCPOA more likely to be adhered to than the Agreed Framework?

Improve this question
2
  • I rewrote the question from scratch to the standard expected on this website. I still think it might be a bit too broad, though. Let's see how the community reacts to it.
    – Philipp ♦
    Nov 12, 2016 at 9:45
  • 1
    I voted to close as too-broad. This question asks us to speculate about two events (whether the JCPOA will be adhered to and whether the Agreed Framework will be adhered to) and contrast our speculations. On the other hand, if we tightened it to ask for a comparison between the control mechanisms in each agreement, I think that would be reasonable.
    – indigochild
    May 10, 2017 at 15:11

1 Answer 1

Reset to default
3

Leaving aside Iran (that another answer already covered), North Korea's motivation was discussed in detail in a recent Stratfor podcast and articles (e.g. here).

  1. Deterrence

    2011 events in Libya (following 2003 renouncement of their nuclear program) showed that a nuclear program rejection does not protect the regime from attacks by the west (and, at least in their eyes, may have spurred such attacks since there was no more deterrent)

    At the same time, the country's leadership had begun to lose faith in the efficacy of bartering its nuclear program for economic and security concessions. The world was changing too fast, North Korea's traditional sponsors were undependable and U.S. promises seemed unreliable. Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's death in late 2011 also gave Pyongyang pause. Even though Gadhafi had abandoned his nuclear ambitions and had been partially reaccepted by the international community, the West stood by and watched as he was overthrown and killed in an uprising. Gadhafi embodied Pyongyang's worst fear: to give up its military deterrent and then fall to a foreign-facilitated insurrection.

  2. Reunification

    DPRK's main geopolitical interest after survival was, and remains, reunification (with South Korea, for those who hid under a rock since 1950s :)

    As such, their nuclear program is absolutely vital and essential to their leadership, since they cannot realistically hope to have enough military leverage over South Korea (with US support) in a conventional-arms military contest

Improve this answer
1
  • This is just half an answer. To make this answer complete you should write a few paragraphs about Iran and how their situation is different.
    – Philipp ♦
    Nov 13, 2016 at 5:09

Not the answer you're looking for? Browse other questions tagged .