Not a proper analogy answer (which doesn't seem to exist), but framing the Canadian system as an intermediate between the US and European continental ones, and with some partial analogies from Israel and Australia, based on Bader (2016) "Parliamentary Supremacy versus Judicial Supremacy":
‘Judicial review’, what’s in the name? [...]
(i) Strong or weak judicial review. In strong constitutional review, courts have the authority to decline
to apply a statute or to modify the effect of a statute (to make it conform with individual rights) or, more
strongly, to establish that, as a matter of law, a given statute will not be applied (law in effect becomes a dead
letter) or even to strike a piece of legislation out of the statute books altogether. In weak judicial review
courts may scrutinize legislation but may not, on a constitutional basis, decline to apply it or moderate its
application. In the UK, a court declaration of incompatibility with a right of the European Convention on
Human Rights does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement and is not binding on the
parties. In the Netherlands, in Sweden or even less strongly in New Zealand, courts may not decline, on
the basis of the constitution, to apply legislation when it violates constitutional rights, but they may strain
to find interpretations that avoid the violation and/or use binding international and European human rights
law to do so. Canada, with the introduction of the notwithstanding clause, is clearly an intermediate case. [...]
The establishment of the clause has been a ‘uniquely Canadian development with no equivalent in either
international human rights documents or Western democratic human rights declarations'. [...] there are a few
later similar clauses such as in Israel 1992 (limited to the right to work) and in Australia in 2006 in the revised
Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act, Section 31.
Alas the paper does not get into more details how the Israeli or Australian law are similar, so you'll have to read them yourself and compare. The 1992 Israeli law mentioned was of brief time span, but it looks like its 1994 Basic Law successor has a similar provision; in Wikipedia's summary
unlike the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the Supreme Court can only disqualify laws that contradict this Basic Law if they do not fullfill the requirements of Section 8.
I'm a bit at a loss with the Victoria Charter, because its Wikipedia page doesn't seem to cover the revised version; sections discussed there stop before 31. But the section definitely existed (with that provision) according to a 2015 review, p. 32, which proposed that section to be repealed. Interestingly that review mentions that an overriding law targeting a specfic individual, namely Julian Knight (apparently regarding his parole), was passed in 2014.
Another paper (Harel and Shinar, 2012) however simply pegs the Canadian approach to the weak judicial review bin [their taxonomy only has two bins], and in doing so finds more analogs:
Weak judicial review is a label for diverse systems that have developed alongside, and in contradistinction to, American-style judicial review. It stands for the idea that constitutional limitations can be enforced without according a final, and sometimes exclusive, role to the judiciary. In New Zealand and several states and territories in Australia, it is a legislative mandate that the court interpret any enactment so that it complies with enumerated individual rights—an interpretation the legislature can reject by a subsequent enactment. In the United Kingdom, alongside the interpretive mandate mechanism, the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has instituted “incompatibility declarations”—a process by which a court declares an enactment to be incompatible with constitutional commitments, leaving it to the legislature to amend, repeal, or leave the statute unchanged. A similar position, which combines the interpretive mandate with incompatibility declarations, has been adopted in the Australian Capital Territory’s Human Rights Act of 2004 (ACT HRA) and the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities of 2006 (VCHRR). In Canada, section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms allows the legislature, with regard to certain (but not all) Charter rights, to actively override a judicial decision, in what is known as the “notwithstanding clause.” Finally, weak judicial review can take the form of weak remedies. These are remedies that relegate courts to a monitoring role, while leaving the particulars to other branches. Such remedies have been noted with respect to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution.
Another way to think of weak judicial review is through the lens of temporality. Strong judicial review allows for quite a limited legislative response to court decisions invalidating statutes. Dissatisfied with a judicial ruling, there is very little the legislature can do. In contrast, weak judicial review allows for real-time legislative response to the judicial decision. The legislature, depending on the system, must act either to incorporate the judicial decision (in cases of “incompatibility”) or overrule it (Canada's “notwithstanding clause” or New Zealand's option to enact a new statute overruling a court's interpretation). Thus, weak judicial review has institutionalized the process of legislative responses to judicial decisions, something which is generally lacking in systems characterized by judicial supremacy
