Ranked choice/instant runoff voting could be useful here, although it is not perfectly ideal (and one could argue that no feasible election system can ever be truly ideal).
In a ranked choice system, the "yes" vote would avoid being split between three implementation options if many favoring "yes" would prefer one of the other implementations over a "no."
However this situation is very difficult to construct 'fairly'
Commenter @MatthewLiu mentioned Arrow's impossibility theorem which states that it is impossible to generate a ranked choice system that is fair by every relevant measure. I'll give one example of why this can be an issue:
If the balance between yes and no is similar and polarized, the "no" vote would get no influence in a ranked choice system (that is, if the vote is split 48% 11% 11% 30%, the most extreme option would be chosen if all of the alternative 2 and 3 voters prefer alternative 4 over alternative 1; the "second choice" of the alternative 1 voters, which might be a partial implementation is never considered).
The problem is further complicated by the fact that few policies can really be neatly divided into ranked alternatives. Informed voters could prefer either extreme of an issue rather than the center if they see problems with the "middle" option that aren't seen on either end, so any ballot that sets up a true ordered system and attempts to select a medium is already making a choice for the voters that the middle options are appropriate as compromises, even if none of the voters choose that middle option. For a silly example, imagine a ballot measure to legalize recreational marijuana, where an alternative is to only legalize recreational marijuana for households with an income greater than $50,000. This is clearly a middle option between "legal for everyone" and "legal for no one," but I think many voters that would be either for or against legalization would be even more strongly against the "middle" option. Ranked choice could work fine in that situation, but some sort of median approach would not.
Approval voting could also capture the yesses together but fail to discriminate between strong preferences between yes options.
There are various more complex systems that allow for voters to weight their preferences among possibilities, but these are also subject to problems including voter confusion and game theory issues that make it unclear how exactly a voter "should" distribute their preferences depending on their actual preferences.