There are various news stories on Russia's jamming GPS fairly precisely, while leaving GLONASS unaffected; e.g.

Since March 23, the U.S. Maritime Administration has issued three alerts for reports of GPS disruption in the eastern Mediterranean. During the same period, and in the same area, Russia and its allies have conducted very high levels of jamming of GPS and other western electronic systems as part of the on-going conflict in Syria.

While no formal maritime alerts have been posted for the Black Sea, the non-profit Flight Services Bureau in partnership with the Airline Cooperative has issued warnings about chronic GPS disruptions in Turkey and Ukraine. Additionally, the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation advises that GPS spoofing and other disruptions appear to be continuing in the Black Sea.

Following a report last year of 20 vessels at sea reporting their locations at airports, the foundation discovered over 600 similar cases in the Baltic and Black Sea over the previous 24 months.

Researchers in Washington, DC, who are preparing an extensive report on GPS spoofing have told the foundation that it is an on-going problem in the Black Sea and elsewhere. Just this week, for example, vessels in the Black Sea were reporting their positions as the Sochi airport. [...]

While both GLONASS and GPS utilize the same band of spectrum, they operate on slightly different frequencies. During a jamming incident in northern Norway last year, authorities were able to document how Russian jamming systems are able to very precisely disrupt GPS signals while leaving GLONASS signals undisturbed.

Is the report mentioned in there publicly available? Or at least something similar documenting in detail the extent of (alleged) Russian jamming of GPS across the globe?

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    I imagine that the US does the same with the Russian GLONASS constallation. I am sure the US military has non-public satellite formations to provide location services when necessary
    – Agustus
    Apr 25 '19 at 22:20
  • 1
    @Agustus apparently, Glonass seems harder to jam. As for the military, they may have more access to obtain better accuracy, but they don't have more satellites that the others (China / Russia) don't know about.
    – JJJ
    Apr 25 '19 at 23:29
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    @JJJ: that's about the public part of GPS. There's a new M-code for GPS of which less is known. It's supposed to be harder to jam, but it's military only.
    – Fizz
    Apr 26 '19 at 3:20
  • 1
    @Fizz I think that requires more satellites which aren't there yet.
    – JJJ
    Apr 26 '19 at 5:26
  • @Agustus Wishful thinking. It would be impossible to conceal the existence of a second positioning system that with the number of GPS users out there. For example, you'd have to give most infantry soldiers a receiver. Even when GPS itself was classified, only the technical details were secret, the existence of the system was public.
    – user71659
    Apr 26 '19 at 20:34

The BBC wrote an article on this recently, the first line reads:

Russian President Vladimir Putin has a bubble of spoofed GPS signals projected around him when he visits sensitive locations, a study suggests.

The BBC article links to this report titled Above us only stars exposing GPS Spoofing in Russia and Syria. The authors have also published a more interactive version of their report which is basically a web page that's support by a lot of visual elements. That version can be found here.

The second paragraph (the first is an introduction to the subject) of the executive summary of the full report describes its contents (I added clarification for initialisms in square brackets):

In this report, we present findings from a year-long investigation ending in November 2018 on an emerging subset of EW [electronic warfare] activity: the ability to mimic, or “spoof,” legitimate GNSS [Global Navigation Satellite Systems] signals in order to manipulate PNT [positioning, navigational, and timing] data. Using publicly available data and commercial technologies, we detect and analyze patterns of GNSS spoofing in the Russian Federation, Crimea, and Syria that demonstrate the Russian Federation is growing a comparative advantage in the targeted use and development of GNSS spoofing capabilities to achieve tactical and strategic objectives at home and abroad. We profile different use cases of current Russian state activity to trace the activity back to basing locations and systems in use.

I cannot confirm that this is the report that's mentioned in the question, but it's certainly about the same subject and should be relevant to anyone interested in the article in question.

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