There is a paragraph about similar pacts in its wikipedia page:
It bore a resemblance to the turno pacifico of the restored Spanish
monarchy between 1876 and 1923, in which Conservative and Liberal
Parties alternated in power.
The Miami Pact signed in Cuba in 1957 is also similar to that of
Puntofijo. It was also a political agreement between parties that was
designed to confront dictatorship (Batista's regime), uphold
democracy, as well as invite political participation. Though
ultimately the Miami Pact failed to fulfill its duties as a democratic
deepener due to struggles in the alliance between the signers. The
National Front (Colombia) was another contemporary agreement.
But you probably had already noticed that information and are actually looking for contemporary case-studies. I would argue that that kind of collusion happens in China (quite forced but it exists):
In practice, only one political party holds effective power at the
national level, namely the CPC. Its dominance is such that China is
effectively a one-party state. Eight minor parties are part of the
United Front and also take part in the political system, but they have
limited power on a national level and are almost completely
subservient to the CPC as they must accept the "leading role" of the
CPC as a condition of their continued existence.
And perhaps more similarly in Russia:
In Russian politics, a "party of power" is a specially established
party which unconditionally supports the current president or prime
minister in the parliament.
To find more (possible) examples of this I would recommend the reports from Afro Barometer which puts into perspective how opposition parties are seen in many African nations:
Finally I would put in evidence the paper The Logic of Party Collusion in a Democracy: Evidence from Mali (Gottlieb, 2015), which provides context to the case-study of Mali:
Exploiting the fact that Mali's decentralization produces
within-country variation in both electoral and governance outcomes,
the author uses data from commune council elections alongside
local-level public goods provision as a measure of rent seeking.
Poorer public goods provision is indeed more likely when all political
parties in a district win seats on the council. To show that collusion
is the mechanism driving this relationship, the author tests several
observable implications in the data and uses qualitative evidence as
illustration. This examination of when it is in the strategic interest
of parties to engage in uncompetitive behavior contributes to the
literature on when elections fail to produce democratic
I don't think any of these examples were arranged formally, like the Puntofijo Pact but they might serve as comparison depending on what you are trying to achieve.