Actually, upon further research, it seems that a supermajority requirement to pass legislation was discussed and dismissed in several of the Federalist Papers.
In FEDERALIST NO. 22, Alexander Hamilton argues that such supermajority requirements were one of the flaws in the Articles of Confederation, and that they are "a poison" to democracy:
This is one of those refinements which, in practice, has an effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory. The necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposition that it would contribute to security. But its real operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto, to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. ... If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order that something may be done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings. Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public good. And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when such compromises can take place: for upon some occasions things will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures of government must be injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes border upon anarchy.
James Madison similarly argues against this in FEDERALIST NO. 58, which concludes by briefly mentioning a proposal to require more than 50% of the votes to pass legislation in order to protect the rights of the smaller states. He argues against that idea, for reasons that are immediately recognizable to the modern reader:
It has been said that more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum; and in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures.
But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable indulgences.
Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of secessions; a practice which has shown itself even in States where a majority only is required; a practice subversive of all the principles of order and regular government; a practice which leads more directly to public convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than any other which has yet been displayed among us.
Hamilton and Madison identified the main arguments made in favor of the filibuster: that it would promote unanimity and compromise, slow down governance, and protect minority interests. Both, however, argued that such a system would lead to minority rule and enable a small group to, essentially, hold the country hostage in order to "extort unreasonable indulgences", resulting in "contemptible compromises of the public good". They also argue that it would eventually end up crippling the government by leading to gridlock in cases where government action is necessary.