How does the judicial branch conduct constitutional review under
parliamentary supremacy? If judges can't strike down laws on the
ground that they violate constitution, does that mean Parliament is
tasked to police itself to not make unconstitutional law? That doesn't
Why wouldn't the Parliament just make judiciary as weak as possible
under this system? Isn't parliamentary supremacy incompatible to
United Kingdom (uncodified constitution)
Finland (codified constitution)
Denmark (codified constitution)
Sweden (codified constitution)
Keep in mind, that we don't really care equally about all of the provisions of a constitution, whether or not codified.
If the Finnish courts misinterpret the question of whether summer time or standard time, or the Julian Calendar or the Georgian calendar should be used to determine some key deadline in the constitution, the world will not come to an end.
Finland, Denmark and Sweden are all small unitary states.
Each of these, and the U.K., has a hereditary aristocrat and a healthy political culture to help be the "adult in the room" to maintain legality and dignity to the governmental proceedings.
There are no federalism fights to adjudicate in any of these countries but the U.K., and even then, parliamentary supremacy gives parliament rather than the courts a primary role in dealing with those issues, and the U.K. has a new U.K. Supreme Court is in place to assist it in doing this as well.
Likewise, while some of these countries have bicameral legislatures, in all of them, the lower house is intended to be effectively supreme and the upper house, when there is one, is merely a house of revision. Again, there are no serious intra-governmental separation of powers issues to resolve.
The strategy of all four of these countries to protect human rights isn't vested primarily in their constitution (which in each case is easily amended, at least in principle).
Instead, human rights protections are vested primarily in international treaty obligations as part of the Council of Europe with a European Court of Human Rights having the effective supreme decision making power on human rights issues, even though domestic courts in each of these countries have to adhere to the bare principle that treaty obligations are superior and binding relative to domestic law (and that when there are discrepancies that domestic law needs to be reconciled, somehow, mandatorily with the treaty obligations).
The U.S. does not make treaties supreme over ordinary domestic laws, but it has much less incentive to do than these four countries. These four countries have a strong incentive to respect treaties since they are far more reliant on international commerce governed by treaties as a share of their total economic affairs on a day to day basis than the U.S. does. Abrogating the sacrosanct respect that these countries have for treaty obligation in the face of domestic law making would be a step that would have consequences that none of these European countries could afford to face (even the post-Brexit U.K.).
These treaties are much harder to unilaterally amend than their respective national constitutions. The Council of Europe and its European Court of Human Rights can't unilaterally be undermined by a single member nation, or even a couple of them, gone rogue.
Other treaties protect some international economic rights as well.