The logic goes like this: since both sides know, and they know that the other side also knows, the game theory conclusion for Russia to have any chance of something other than defeat is to massively attack with nuclear weapons the moment enough NATO countries demonstrate they are seriously committed to fighting and enough forces are assembled.

Since it’s understood that the Russian armed forces can’t possibly win an exclusively conventional battle if NATO commits, as the industrial capacity of North America + Europe is so much greater.

Although obviously the losses would be horrendous, with less than a fifth of the population, a 5 or 6 to 1 exchange in favour of Russia would cause vastly asymmetric damage. Thus giving a ‘relative victory’ to Russia, which may be perceived as better than a conventional loss.

This then produces the paradox that the more committed the NATO countries are to fighting, the less safe they become. And the more resources spent on their military, the less safe they become, as the conventional gap grows wider.

Whereas conversely the stronger and more confident Russia becomes conventionally, the lower the chance of them resorting to rapid nuclear escalation, thus making the world safer. (assuming nuclear forces remain constant on both sides)

In economic terms, every extra dollar of wealth generated, and every extra bit of productivity by the NATO countries above and beyond what Russia can produce, actually makes everyone less safe as they decrease the confidence that Russia can resist a conventional loss.

It sounds totally bizarre, is there a better interpretation?

  • 28
    Leaving aside some major doubts about the premise, which actually distract from the very interesting question: It is the classic cold war dilemma. That's why we used to have arms control, until our NeoCon friends in DC decided they knew better, starting with the Bush-II administration and continuing to return to 1950s mentality ever since. At the same time, it had been observed that peacetime military spending is as much about business as strategy.
    – Pete W
    Jan 2 at 15:46
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    How is a mutual nuclear destruction better for Russia than a loss in a convential war? In the first case there is no more Russia afterwards, in the second there is.
    – quarague
    Jan 2 at 16:38
  • 10
    Modern conventional warfare is about a lot more than numbers of troops and weapons, it is largely about national commitment in terms of capital, both monetary and political. This is a much more complicated calculation than just comparing troop/weapons strength. Jan 2 at 18:23
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    What do you think "beating" Russia means? Unless and until you define that, you're only going to get meaningless generalities in your answers. Wars are fought to achieve some objective, and it is exceedingly unlikely that NATO would pursue an unconditional surrender in the first place.
    – fectin
    Jan 3 at 16:40
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    Let's start with questions about the premise. I see "everyone knows" as an appeal to prejudice: (1) which "everyone"? (1a) Given 7..8 billion people on the planet; which ones did the OP check with (likely closer to 7..8)? (1b) How was the translation managed (surely 1+ Russians were consulted)? (2) What if this "everyone" is missing vital information about Russia's weapon systems? (3) What if the Russian officials are: (3a) otherwise informed, (3b) otherwise motivated than the general welfare, (3c) subject to neurological 'events', (4) factors we've not considered? Jan 4 at 0:29

5 Answers 5


Russia might also be convinced that NATO lacks the political coherence and will to fight, and that going nuclear would be a "Pearl Harbor moment" which turns it into a fight-to-the-finish. Russian tourists helping a separatists movement in the near abroad are one thing, nuclear weapons are something else. The term to read about is Hybrid Warfare.

My personal estimate is that MAD still stands, even if Russia professes to be worried about growing American missile defenses. And the Russian investment in hypersonics suggests that Russia is serious, not just making propaganda noises. Which brings up the stability-instability paradox: as long as MAD stands, minor conflicts won't go major, so minor conflicts can be risked.

Another interesting question is how long a conflict would last. An American think tank believes that Russia could overrun the Baltics in 60 hours. NATO has deployed tripwire forces in the Baltics, they can't stop Russia but they would make it a fight with a dozen NATO member states.

Compare the Western reassurances for Ukraine, which are far less robust. Biden all but admitted that they won't send troops, only arms and sanctions. Those sanctions are going to be interesting -- if the US bans Russia from SWIFT, will that stop the Russian sale of gas to Europe? With the Nord Stream pipeline system, they could still deliver gas even if Ukraine stops transit (or of the infrastructure in Ukraine is damaged). Then-President Trump complained that Nord Stream 2 increases the European dependence on Russian gas. It doesn't. It decreases Russian and European dependence on Ukraine for the gas transport.

  • 1
    @M.Y.Zuo, that's not certain. I see two key problems: the Russian leadership believes that the West wants to forment a colour revolution in Russia, and Russia does not accept that the countries on the border of a great power (like them) are free to apply to whichever alliance they want to. This has nothing to do with the number of missiles, and everything with perceptions of political threats.
    – o.m.
    Jan 2 at 18:42
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    @o.m. It is not just that Russia doesn't want OTAN on it's doorstep (why would they, we saw how USA reacted with missiles on their doorstep in 1962), but there is probably a legal reason why Ukraine cannot join any military alliance, not just OTAN. This Declaration is the basis for this Act on which Ukrainian Constitution is based. In Declaration, in point 9 it clearly says "that Ukraine will not take part in any military block". And Constitution is based on that Declaration through Act.
    – dosvarog
    Jan 2 at 19:09
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    @dosvarog, according to NATO it is the Ukraine (and not Russia) which decides about making the application, and NATO (and not Russia) which decides about accepting it. Those are two distinct decisions. What the constitutional requirements in the Ukraine are is for Ukrainian courts. It might also enter the judgement of NATO when NATO looks at the application. Russia has no legal standing to sue (but they could certainly find Ukrainians to do it for them, in Ukrainian courts).
    – o.m.
    Jan 3 at 5:19
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    @rexkogitans Nord Stream 2 increases the European dependency on Russian gas in the sense that it increases the gas supply, bringing prices down, therefore disincentivising the transitioning to a fossil fuel free economy. Increasing the drugs supply to a drug addict increases their addition, not so much compared to the status quo, but compared to a successful programme to become clean.
    – gerrit
    Jan 3 at 17:09
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    @o.m. for sure. But admittance of Ukraine is not for Ukraine to decide, it is for NATO members countries to decide. And I really fail to see any upside for existing NATO members, so perhaps another model could be used, one that did not screw over Ukrainians but also did not present a security risk to Russia? Switzerland-like? Anyway, my main point is that citing the 1996 constitution's blocks on alliances is valid, but ignores that its context has radically changed. Finland remark is a minor point. Jan 4 at 17:53

The hypothesis cited is extremely speculative, to put it mildly. The world survived 44 years of high level competition between the USSR and NATO, when there was a fundamental drive by both systems to extinguish the other.

Avoiding total war was based on:

  • strong mutual conventional deterrence, meaning that there was ample room to escalate and de-escalate using conventional forces.
  • Mutually Assured Destruction at the nuclear level, should either bloc put the other truly at risk.
  • well-honed communication channels that were set up to avoid misunderstandings.
  • A clear understanding by both blocs that they had to keep their armed forces out of direct combat with each other, opting instead to work through proxies.

Most of this machinery is essentially still in place, yet what has dropped out is a very strong commitment by the US to end Communism, and a strong commitment by Russia/USSR to end capitalism. Compared to those times, what we are seeing today in the Ukraine arena is of very limited real danger to either bloc.

Russia does not have the forces to beat the West, but it also has no real reason to pursue the type of confrontation that would escalate to nuclear.

The US/Nato would never be able to "sell" to their electorate the idea of "putting Russia out of action". To be honest, it does not, nor should it, have the intent to fight Russia militarily to protect Ukraine. That sounds horrible, so let me repeat it: the West has no vital interest justifying putting its own troops in harm's way in Ukraine and risking an escalation chain. If Ukraine gets attacked, Russia will suffer consequences, but not of the type you imagine.

We are supposedly at greater risk now than we were say in 1985 and we would be safer if we were unarmed?

Color me skeptical. Both groups will continue to vie for regional influence, but at the end of the day nothing very significant will come out of it, except possibly some more misery for Ukraine. And a lot of economic pain to Russia if that happens.

Russia, in 2022, is not a long term existential threat to the West. China might end up taking on that role (hopefully we will avoid a second Cold War), but Russia is not. Russia teaming up with China? Quite possible, but also exactly the kind of development that would strongly rebut your advice.

  • 2
    NATO used to be unable to resist Soviet conventional forces, so they promised to escalate to nuclear war. That deterrence worked for a few decades ...
    – o.m.
    Jan 2 at 8:00
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    @o.m. in theory. In practice, would Soviet forces have punched through using conventional only and sustained the logistics? That is very much open for debate and in fact Soviet battle plans emphasized nuclear-supported tactical penetration. Threatening to escalate to nuclear war, by either side, was one way to keep ambiguity and avoid being gamed short of declared thresholds. Jan 2 at 8:04
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    @M.Y.Zuo Nukes were always a last-resort for both sides but both systems were ideologically incompatible, with both claiming they wanted to shut the other down. Marxism raison d'etre is after all ending Capitalism (according to people who know its theory, I just follow Gulag victim counts and military doctrines). And US Capitalism had a rather rabid attitude towards Communism itself. Both sides still have their nukes left, but nowhere near the desire to wipe the other out and impose its will. So, no, 2022 is not 1985. Jan 2 at 18:34
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    This answer assumes that Western governments act in the interest of their people. The West has not had a vital interest in any of the conflicts it's engaged in post WW2. The reason for putting Western troops in harm's way in Ukraine would be the same as it's always been since Smedley Butler wrote War is a Racket: enrichment of politically connected industries at taxpayer expense. Jan 3 at 16:38
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    Abuses by the West in places like Central America, failure to recognize reasonable aspirations for liberty in South Vietnam and the support of numerous pro-Western dictatorships (South Korea, Taiwan) do tarnish this struggle. But they do not obviate the need for standing firm against such a tyrannical system. What about racial injustices? True enough, again a stain on Western values, but one needs only look at the fate of the Cossacks in 1944 to see that the vaunted Communist ideal of universal human brotherhood was a joke. Better said here Jan 3 at 17:23

This question seems to simply presuppose that NATO is an aggressive entity bent on wiping out Russia, as "The West is wealthy" is treated as identical to "The West can support a large military", which is identical to "The West can conquer Russia", which is identical to "The West will conquer Russia". There's no question that the US could wipe out Mexico's military rather easily, but I don't see Mexicans clamoring for nukes. It would be absurd for Russia to launch a nuclear attack against the West simply because the West has high productivity and could launch an attack on Russia. Russia loses nothing by waiting for an actual attack before launching, and gains in the case where the West was not planning on attacking in the first place.

Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia has repeatedly engaged in aggression against former states of the USSR, and a decrease in conventional power on the part of the West simply encourages such behavior. Russia is an oligarchy largely controlled by one man, while the West is a collection of states with a large degree of democratic control. This makes Russia much more likely to be the aggressor, and giving them more power decreases stability.

  • I see no such presupposition in the question. Jan 3 at 12:41
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    Russia has been invaded from Western Europe several times in history (I'm not sure if Russia has ever invaded Western Europe except for WW II) but never while Moscow was so close to the border. That's probably why they're keen on keeping Belarus and Ukraine as their satellites, having already lost most/all of the rest as a buffer zone.
    – gerrit
    Jan 3 at 17:18
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    @gerrit Pretty much every country has been invaded, and most, like Russia, have invaded other countries. This "we're justified in invading other countries to create a buffer zone against other countries invading us" argument is silly. Moscow is ~200 miles from their closest border, more than the width of most countries. Jan 3 at 18:14
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    @Acccumulation says a citizen of pretty much the least-invaded country of the world ;-) I don't believe the Russians are only doing this for defensive reasons, but, if they were, their security concerns would not be all that dissimilar to the US's reaction to Cuba during the Cold War. BTW, assuming your opponent means you no harm isn't the highpoint of clear contingency planning. Jan 4 at 15:51
  • 1
    "Russia is an oligarchy largely controlled by one man, while the West is a collection of states with a large degree of democratic control. This makes Russia much more likely to be the aggressor, and giving them more power decreases stability." Citation needed. While dictatorships and autocracies may be horrible to those living under them, democracies are far more dangerous to outsiders. While tyrants spend their time tyrannizing its own people, democracies resort to external wars to distract people from internal affairs. Most attacks on external soil are carried by democracies.
    – Rekesoft
    Jan 7 at 9:15

No, because game theory assumes you have to play the game

As von Clausewitz famously said, war is a continuation of politics by other means. War is not an end in itself, and war is not the only way to win. The West did not win the previous Cold War by being militarily stronger, they won it by being economically stronger. For another way to win economically, China are currently taking over the world quietly by making large infrastructure loans to developing nations, and then taking assets from that country instead when they can't repay their loans.

War also assumes you have something to gain once it's over. Typically this is economic resources, as exemplified by Germany and Japan in WW2. If it's purely a willy-waving exercise where you start posturing and find you can't back down (as in WW1) then you generally need some way to present the enemy as an existential threat to your people. That's fairly achievable for immediate neighbours, but rather harder for an entire continent. Alternatively (as with Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran) you need to be a sufficiently brutal dictator that your people will do what you say because they're more scared of you than the enemy - this is an option, but it's harder to do in more advanced countries.

And more than that, this game theory assumes "acceptable losses" are genuinely acceptable. Fewer UK military personnel were killed in Afghanistan and Iraq over both campaigns than die on UK roads in a single year - but these weren't deemed acceptable losses. Is it genuinely acceptable to have every major city nuked, lose 80% of your population, and have the survivors reduced to a life of hand-to-mouth subsistence for at least a generation with all industrialisation basically destroyed?

To quote a well-known film, "The only winning move is not to play."

  • I saw that particular film no less than twelve times in junior high school, because it was the tool teachers used to mind students when they had other obligations and the school only had two or three movies available in its stockpile. :)
    – ohwilleke
    Jan 4 at 22:30

Frame Challenge:

You forgot about the likelihood of China and Russia aligning in any conventional armed conflict. They have a rough past sure, but the enemy of my enemy is my friend. If NATO is the enemy, they're best buds. This tips the scales far closer to even. Even if not a direct alliance, China would most likely supply the difference in armaments on loan. It's in their interest to protect the shared border with Russia from any Western influence.

To be clear here, my point is that M.A.D. is practically guaranteed in modern conventional war as well (note Russia FOAB mentioned in the article, amongst the literal 100,000's of "small" bombs in each nations stockpiles), if the U.S. and any other large, modern nation "went at it" without holding back. It's unlikely a full-scale conventional war between any of the powers mentioned will occur again - instead the countries will opt for proxy wars fighting for influence, as they've done for decades. In terms of "taking over" another nation, that's much more likely to be attempted (and accomplished) through economic, and even cultural "warfare".

The frame challenge is that neither Russia nor the U.S. has any real, worthwhile interest in a full scale conventional war with the other. A key factor would be, if nukes were entirely eliminated, that other parties besides Russia would have an interest in harming the U.S. effort, namely China given the modern political landscape.






  • Speculative in the extreme. Russia and China are anything but best buddies. While their interests may coincide at times, and one may see a move by the other as an opportunity for itself, that doesn't mean active cooperation. So if China attacks Taiwan, drawing substantial US forces there, Russia may see an opportunity and attack Ukraine and the Baltics now that the US is weak in Europe.
    – jwenting
    Jan 4 at 8:23
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    Thought: China probably picked up something from the USA in WW2 and will likely have a great time staying out of a potential conflcit between the NATO and Russia and benefit greatly from having an unharmed production capacity and a relatively unharmed (or even boosted because everyone will be buying from them) economy. Jan 4 at 14:03
  • @jwenting Do the 5 sources I've included not remove much of the speculation?
    – TCooper
    Jan 4 at 15:30
  • @BenjaminGruenbaum Please see the sentence "Even if not a direct alliance, China would happily supply the difference in armaments on loan."
    – TCooper
    Jan 4 at 15:31

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