The founding premise of PLO was that Palestine should be liberated
through armed struggle, similar to how FLN and NLF liberated
Algeria and Vietnam from colonial rule.1 However, unlike
the Algerian and Vietnamese people, the Palestinian people is
geographically fragmented with more Palestinians living outside than
inside of Palestine. Due to Israeli interference, PLO never gained a
foothold within Palestine and instead had to operate from Palestinian
bases in the surrounding states.
In the 1970's, PLO conducted guerilla warfare against Israel from
Lebanon. This warfare failed to move Israel and incensed its Lebanese
hosts who suffered the brunt of Israeli retaliation. It came to an
end in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon during which Israel
ousted PLO from the country.2 As no other state would
host the PLO guerillas, they relocated to Tunisia, over a thousand
kilometers away from Palestine. The physical distance made armed
struggle impossible.
The bloody war was a military defeat for PLO, but also a diplomatic
bluster for Israel. It's heavy-handedness and bombings of densely
populated refugee camps tarnished the country's image. The most iconic
moment of the war was the Sabra and Shatila massacre in which an
Israeli-backed Lebanese militia killed over 2,000 Palestinian
civilians in two refugee camps.2
Meanwhile, strategic thinking within PLO changed. Politicans
began to talk about a two-state solution with a Palestinian state
existing alongside - not replacing - Israel. By 1982 this
transformation was complete. The struggle shifted focus, from
guerrilla warfare to searching for a political solution.3
No similar policy shift occurred on the Israeli side. It (and the US too)
continued to regard PLO as a terrorist organization with which it
would never negotiate. Furthermore, it continued to build settlements
on territory it had occupied in the 1967 war, in contravention of
international law.
In December 1987 a Palestinian popular uprising in the occupied
territories against the Israeli occupation -- the first intifada
--broke out. And with it came Hamas. Hamas was ideologically opposed
to Fatah (the dominant party in PLO) and based in Islamism rather than
the latter's left-wing secularism. It had its power base in Palestine,
in Islamic charities operating in Israel and in the occupied
territories. While PLO could only watch the intifada from afar, Hamas
actively participated in it.
Against this backdrop, masterminded by Yassir Arafat, PLO launched a
"peace offensive" in 1988. The plight of the Palestinians would be
presented to the international community and the United States in
particular to put diplomatic pressure on Israel to force it to the
negotiation table.4,5 The same year, PLO also declared the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state and called for
convening an international peace conference to settle the Palestine
question on the basis of Security council resolutions 242
and 338. This declaration effectively recognized Israel's right to
exist and limited the Palestinian claim to the Palestinian territories
occupied in the 1967 war. PLO furthermore rejected "terrorism in all
of its forms, including state terrorism." I.e. it acceded to the US
administration's conditions for dialogue. Israeli intransigence,
however, meant that no PLO-US dialogue were forthcoming.6,7
Two developments in the early 1990's greatly affected PLO. The first
was the collapse of the Soviet union. With it, PLO lost the backing of
a super power. It also feared the influx of up to a million Soviet
Jews which Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir threatened to settle
in the occupied territories.5 The second was Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait and PLO's support for Iraq. It was a strategic
blunder of gigantic proportions. It eroded international support for
PLO including the consensus (except for the US and Israel) on the need
for Palestinian self-determination and it caused a massive shortfall
in the PLO's coffers as the wealthy gulf states stopped their
donations.8 Incidentally, Hamas did not throw its weight
behind Saddam and was rewarded with continued financial
assistance.5
So what could have caused PLO to enter into secret negotiations with
Israel that culminated in the Oslo accord?
An earnest belief in that there was a diplomatic solution to the
conflict. Indeed, PLO had for years sought to negotiate with
Israel.
Failure to comprehend the Israeli strategy. The West Bank is not
the Sinai. Israel considers the West Bank Jewish heartland that is
theirs by right. Arafat had not even seen an Israeli settlement
with his own eyes and perhaps did not understand that Israel was
not willing to let the Palestinians have a sovereign state on the
territory. In fact, what the Palestinians eventually received from
Oslo is less than earlier ideas for limited autonomy the Israelis
had proposed such as the Allon plan or the self-governing plans
sported by Menachem Begin during the Camp David talks.
PLO had renounced terrorism and the Palestinians' claim to 78% of
historical Palestine (Israel proper) and needed a big "win" to show
that the sacrifices were worth it.
Competition from Hamas and other "rejectionist" groups.9
The disastrous situation for the PLO caused by its support for
Saddam Hussein. By 1992, PLO was isolated, facing bankruptcy and
divided within itself.10 As PLO negotiator Ahmed Qurei
recounted: "under these circumstances, we had no alternative but to
go to Oslo when the idea presented itself, however unlikely or
unpromising it might seem. Such a meeting seemed a last hope to
keep our cause alive"11
The Allon Plan, proposed by Israeli minister Yigal Allon after the 1967 war (from Wikipedia):
Footnotes
- Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, Yezid Sayigh, 1997, p.112-129
- 1982 Lebanon war, Michael Fischbach
- The Palestinian Dilemma: PLO Policy after Lebanon, Rashid Khalidi, 1985
- Arafat's Trials at Tunis: Enemies Inside and Out
- Sayigh, The Road to Oslo, p.638-51
- Palestinian Declaration of Independence, 1988: Historic Undertakings For the Sake of Statehood, Maher Charif
- P.L.O. Proclaims Palestine to be an independent State; hints at recognizing Israel, Youssef M. Ibrahim, Nov. 15, 1988
- The PLO and the Gulf Crisis, Philip Mattar, 1994
- “Did you enjoy Oslo?” London’s West End applauds a failed peace process, 2018, Robert A.H. Cohen
- Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations, 1997, Mohammed Heikal, p.10
- From Oslo to Jerusalem: The Palestinian Story of the Secret Negotiations, 2006, Ahmed Qurei