Why not have a partial no-fly zone for Ukraine? [duplicate]

Question

From what I understand, the major argument against establishing a no-fly zone is that it requires attacks beyond Ukraine's borders. The first step in establishing a no-fly zone is to knock out AA defences on the ground. Since many of those defences are likely to be located within Russia's borders, it means bombs and missiles hitting Russian soil - something that's not politically possible yet.

But what are the arguments against a partial no-fly zone? By partial, I'm thinking something like western Ukraine delineated by Dnieper river. That way all the SEAD sorties would strike Kherson plus I'm guessing a 100km buffer on the other side of Dnieper. This area we're talking about is definitely not Russian soil by any stretch of the imagination. Not even Russia claims that Kherson is Russian soil - yet. Why not act now before it becomes de-facto Russian soil?

Doing this would accomplish the following:

• Send a clear message regarding support for Ukraine's sovereignty
• Free up Ukrainian AA and air force from duties in western Ukraine to be made available in the east
• Help unblock Odessa's port
• Air tankers for Ukrainian jets
• Better AWACS intel by getting closer to the front line
• Introduce a layer of deniability regarding what air assets are flown by Ukrainians and which assets are flown by allies. (Plausible deniability for limited strikes that are required to hit Russian soil)
• Waste Russian SAMs by forcing them to shoot long range with low hit probabilities while revealing their positions for Ukrainian attacks up close.
• Alleviate some of the worries about Belorussian re-invasion from the north
• Destroy Russian war assets including AA equipped ships (all that don't get out of the way), SAM systems and aircraft.
• Provide air cover for Ukrainian army to take back Kherson
• Setup a controlled framework for pushing east in a systematic manner where there are very fewer surprises for Russia and clear understanding for citizens of allied countries.
• When no-fly is a success, this will lay groundwork for a for setting up a limited no-go zone on the ground (ex make Kyiv a no-go zone on the ground) to protect against re-invasion.

If the counter argument is that Dnieper is still way too far east. And/or that 100 km buffer is not enough to project jets from long range SAMs, what about the same idea but even further west? Or committing only unmanned drones close to this demarcation line while keeping piloted jets out east. Even then, the exception could be low level attacks with A-10's, Apaches and such.

Back to the question. Why is it all or nothing rather than some type of a customized implementation that fits the current needs? The extreme version of this question is "why not have a no-fly zone only directly above Lviv?" While tactically insignificant, even that little gesture would be a complete win on strategic and political level. It's because even if Russia takes 90% of Ukraine, it can never hope to have whatever corner happens to be covered by a no-fly zone. Lack of hope is a powerful weapon.

Answer 1

Any no-fly zone over Ukraine, even a partial one, is unlikely, because it will result in direct confrontation of NATO and Russia. Since both parties have nuclear weapons, this raises the risk of a global nuclear war, and a possible destruction of civilization.

REFERENCES:

That is also why an NFZ is so breathtakingly dangerous, with the potential to raise the risks of nuclear war. An NFZ needs to be enforced by military means, putting US and NATO pilots in the position of shooting down Russian aircraft and killing some of their personnel, both in the air and on the ground. There is another problem: Russia’s long-range air defenses reach well into Ukraine from Russia and Belarus, so effective enforcement of a full or even partial NFZ would almost certainly require bombing Russian territory.

Calling it a “limited” or “humanitarian” NFZ in no way limits the risks. It still amounts to a declaration of war against Russia. A “humanitarian” NFZ may “not seek direct confrontation with Russian forces,” but Putin would hold all the escalatory cards in this scenario.

A no-fly zone over Ukraine? The case against NATO doing it. By Kelly A. Grieco, March 18, 2022: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-no-fly-zone-over-ukraine-the-case-against-nato-doing-it/

---

Despite these calls, U.S. President Joe Biden and his advisors have consistently rejected the idea of a NATO-enforced no-fly zone over Ukraine. They argue that the policy would lead to direct combat between U.S. and Russian forces and risk uncontrollable escalation—the “exact step that we want to avoid,” as White House press secretary Jen Psaki said on March 3. Last Friday, Biden underscored this view. “We will not fight a war against Russia in Ukraine. Direct confrontation between NATO and Russia is World War III, something we must strive to prevent,” he said.

International relations (IR) experts overwhelmingly agree with Biden. The Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project at William & Mary’s Global Research Institute asked IR scholars at U.S. universities and colleges for their views on the use of U.S. air power to enforce a no-fly zone over Ukraine. The results reported below are based on responses from 866 respondents surveyed between March 10 and 14. (Complete results can be found here.)

These experts are nearly unanimous in their opposition to the establishment and enforcement of a no-fly zone over Ukraine. Respondents reject a U.S.-enforced no-fly zone because they fear it raises the risk of escalation, including the likelihood of a Russian nuclear attack against Ukraine or NATO countries.

Poll: Experts Oppose No-Fly Zone Over Ukraine. IR scholars overwhelmingly say involving U.S. air power risks uncontrollable escalation. Biden and his advisors agree. By Irene Entringer Garcia Blanes, Ryan Powers, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney. March 16, 2022: https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/16/poll-no-fly-zone-ukraine-zelensky-speech-biden/

Answer 2

The problem with the no-fly zone is not just that it might require strikes on Russian soil. Just as importantly, it would require strikes by the enforcing powers against the Russian armed forces. That is commonly understood to mean WAR wherever it happens¹, while providing weapons without the crews is understood to mean NOT WAR. A war between nuclear powers is a very bad idea.

The US or NATO have all necessary legal justifications for going to war against Russia, since they would be helping Ukraine in collective self-defense. (That doesn't require prior treaties.)

¹ Unless both sides agree to treat it as an unfortunate accident, and not as an act of war.

---

As a personal note, I have sympathy for people who are grasping at possible solutions to stop the attacks on civilians. But, please, don't deceive yourself about steps that will mean WAR. Starting one in a half-hearted way would be just about the worst thing the US and NATO can do.

Answer 3

A partial no-fly zone:

• solves very few actual problems
• risks nuclear confrontation
  • is only marginally less escalatory than a full no-fly zone
• reinforces Putin's narrative that it's the West-vs-Russia, not Russia-vs-Ukraine

Let's start out with the first.

What does it achieve, exactly?

Currently there are 4 main ongoing problems:

• Russia is aggressing Ukraine. A partial no-fly zone doesn't automatically stop that. At most it "sends a message".

• Russia is grinding through Ukrainian forces near Severodonetsk. This is being done with artillery, mostly. The Russian air force is more active than before, but is not key. And, it isn't in this proposed no-fly area anyway.

• Russia's war is blocking grain shipments out of Odessa, which is causing slow-motion humanitarian catastrophe. This doesn't solve it.

• Russia is conducting atrocities against civilians. With artillery strikes near Kharkiv, missile strikes near Kiev. Bucha is quite likely being redone elsewhere. This doesn't solve it.

Nuclear confrontation risks.

(I defer to the first answer as to why it is a risk and why experts, not just pundits like me, think it is a bad idea). But let's address the historical counter argument that "it's been done before, and it worked out".

Yes, we've had "nuclear-state-on-nuclear-state skirmishes" before.

• Pakistan and India fought a minor war. So what? Very bad idea. Had they gone to nuke each other, that would have been a horrible. However, their arsenals do not present an existential risk to the human race.

• China and USSR, in 1969. Again, so what? China had very few nukes - their first test was 5 years before - and couldn't have done much had it come to nukes. Bad idea, no existential risk.

• Cuban Missile Crisis. 1962. Now we're talking. An equally hare-brained idea as the previous 2, which did almost get to a nuclear war. And this would have been the big one, even if Russia had nowhere the nukes it has today. If you play Russian roulette often enough, you will get unlucky. So claiming that it's alright because you hit an empty chamber is a rather unconvincing argument.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis, cited as an example why "it's not so bad", both the US and USSR recognized the risks and resolved not to put their forces into direct combat contact. That was the correct position 50 years ago, it is now.

The first 2 had limited casualties, and took place in essentially empty territory. The 3rd had no casualties. A longer, much more bitter, round of fighting, like we've been seeing in Ukraine, makes it less likely that cooler heads will prevail if things start to escalate.

The risk of nuclear escalation is low, certainly. But they need to be weighed against the downsides if it does happen, which are catastrophic.

Strengthen's Putin's narrative

Since the invasion's initial troubles Putin has been shifting his narrative to recast the war as a struggle of NATO-vs-Russia rather than just Ukraine-vs-Russia. Poor Russia has no choice but to defend itself:

• things aren't going well, not because of Putin's incompetence, but because of NATO's involvement.
• sacrifices by the Russian people are necessary because their country is at risk. Ukraine may not make a great bogeyman, NATO sure as heck does.

Involving NATO combat troops directly plays right into his hands. Within Western countries any "near misses" related to no fly zones will certainly strengthen the arguments of the appeasers for pushing Ukraine into a ceasefire.

Answer 4

Because the American government does not wish to impose a no-fly zone of any sort at the present time, and NATO members that might wish to establish an NFZ do not believe they have the capability to do so and also uphold their other military commitments.

Of course, you might (reasonably) protest that the above answer doesn't really answer anything and just invites the question "Why doesn't the American government wish to impose an NFZ?". It is questionable how on-topic the internal motivations of the US government are for this site, but nevertheless we can think of several reasons why they might choose to act this way:

• As has been alluded to on many occasions, they fear that a more direct confrontation between American and Russian forces could result in a damaging escalation of the conflict, possibly culminating in a full-scale nuclear war.
• American politicians and military commanders do not wish to risk their personnel and materiel in a war that does not pose a direct existential threat to the United States. This would be a significant change in the dominant US foreign policy, but there has long been a faction advocating this view in American society.
• The US government wishes to "keep its powder dry" and avoid getting entangled in Eastern Europe, anticipating an even more serious conflict. The obvious antagonist in this conflict is China, which the American government seems to regard as its most significant rival.
• Politicians feel that the US public now has such a hostile attitude to overseas military expeditions (a modern analogue of Vietnam Syndrome), that committing forces to such an expedition would greatly weaken their party.
• They believe that Ukrainian forces can successfully repulse the Russian invasion without such an NFZ and that doing so without direct American military assistance would be beneficial, from a morale and propaganda perspective.
• It is possible that they perceive a "meat grinder" involving Russian forces in Eastern Europe to be to their advantage in some respect, and so are unwilling to pursue a course of action which may bring the war to a swift conclusion.
• American military commanders are concerned that they lack the capability to impose an NFZ and have advised government decision makers of this.

I've tried to summarise some "obvious" motivations above, but the list is not intended to be exhaustive and nor should every suggestion be considered likely.