I was thinking about expanding my answer to the other Q with something about this, so I'm glad you asked (separately).
I don't want to speculate much on what "the West" would do if China were to send weapons to Russia in the present circumstances, but suffice to say that's pretty different from invading a country, and even the SWIFT measures against Russia have exceptions, e.g. to accommodate those countries (like Hungary etc.) that absolutely insisted on still buying energy or nuclear materials/tech from Russia etc., while being part of "the West", or more precisely of the EU in this case. So there are exceptions in sanctions for Gazprombank, Rosatom, etc. which IIRC Russia reciprocated by only asking for rubles from "unfriendly countries". [Rosatom is still building new reactors in Hungary, so it's not just gas and oil.]
Sending weapons is also a matter of degree/types and quantity (just see how the Western version of that played out over the last year), so that leaves plenty of room for graduated/proportional responses when one group of countries doesn't like another sending some weapons. Suddenly stopping some imports [not necessarily intentionally] has a reverse side of the coin of causing some inflation in the importer, unless similarly priced substitutes are found. We saw plenty examples of that in the past couple of years, including from the Covid-related disruptions in shipping [from China to the US, but also much more broadly around the globe] seeing, Russia's changes in energy supply or conditions for that seeing price spikes in some Western countries etc.
So, the reverse side of the coin is that the West has some habit/expectancy of cheap goods from China on a fairly large scale. This is in essence the basic theory of "peace through trade" that countries would be unwilling to go nuts on each other when they have substantial economic interdependencies.
It's easy to point to counter-examples when it fails, but some statistical modelling/evidence suggests there is some [sound] basis for that idea. Slightly more nuanced view/data on that that accounts for nationalism identifies one locus of said exceptions. (Another factor dampening the effect of [bilateral] trade is having multilateral trade, i.e. countries with diversified [or easily diversifiable] trade partners are less likely to be deterred that way.)