Why does Russia see NATO as an aggressor when the Istanbul document signed by Russia grants each participant the right to chose its allies separately?

Question

The Istanbul document was a declaration signed in 1999 by Russia and Ukraine. Its legal character is similar to that of the Declaration of Human rights.

It contains the following paragraph:

We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve.

So why is Russia complaining that countries of the former Soviet Union want to join NATO when it signed a declaration granting that right explicitly?

Answer 1

Russia (the Russian government) claims to believe that Ukraine and Europe are not sovereign actors, but rather controlled by the US. I do not know if they actually do believe that, but considering their apparent mis-judgements to date that is not impossible.

Russia also claims to believe that "the West" (read: Washington) are actively fomenting colour revolutions in the ex-Soviet sphere to diminish Russian influence, and possibly in Russia itself to overthrow the current government. Again, I cannot judge if they do believe it.

They claim that "the West" exploited a brief moment of Russian weakness to take away the empire which is historically Russia's birthright as the successor of the Roman Empire and the representative of Christian civilization. Basically, blame the language of the OSCE document on that drunkard Yeltsin, who resigned that year. And if the populations in the Russkiy Mir fail to see it the same way, that makes Russia claim those populations are misled by corrupted elites and need to be rescued.

Answer 2

Circumstances can change, perceptions can change, and people can change their minds.

Once upon a time in the 1990s Russia itself wanted to join NATO.

But through a series of smaller geopolitical conflicts and perceived political slights, Russia has come to believe that Cold War conflicts with the US have not been extinguished.

With Ukraine, their perception seems to be that US meddling has finally arrived on their doorstep and that their interests are to pre-empt any further deterioration.

So the reason Russia is complaining now about the alliances of its neighbours, despite having previously indicated a willingness to accept independent arrangements, is that those governing Russia have changed their mind about the effects and implications since they last indicated their acceptance.

As others have already indicated in answers and comments, the Russian population also largely repudiates the politics of the 1990s, so that decisions made then could not be expected to reflect political views now.

Answer 3

The extent that Russia accepted that principle had already reached its limit by 2008, when (in the context of the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, which he attended), where the candidacy of Georgia and Ukraine were on the table, Putin said that

We view the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders, a bloc whose members are subject in part to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as a direct threat to the security of our country. The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice. [...]

We have eliminated bases in Cam Ranh (Vietnam) and in Cuba. We have withdrawn our troops deployed in eastern Europe, and withdrawn almost all large and heavy weapons from the European part of Russia. And what happened? A [US] base in Romania, where we are now, one in Bulgaria, an American missile defence area in Poland and the Czech Republic. That all means moving military infrastructure to our borders.

(TBH, I'm not sure what he meant by "we have [...] withdrawn almost all large and heavy weapons from the European part of Russia".) In the same speech he says that NATO's "out of area" operations (like Kosovo) cast doubt on the alliance's true goals, and complains that the (then recently admitted to NATO) Latvia didn't give citizenship to its Russian speakers.

And while this was surely not first time someone in a position of power in Russia said something like that (even Yeltsin protested the idea of a NATO expansion in the 1990s, but was more easily placated), Russia made its point in 2008 by invading Georgia, in response to the renewed clashes between Georgian armed forces and South Ossetian separatists. Later on, Medvedev (president during the seat swap with Putin) declared that the armed intervention in Georgia was essential in having prevented Georgia from joining NATO.

Some Western observers pointed out in Feb 2022 that Russia was repeating the "Georgia playbook" with Ukraine.

Yeah, someone is gonna say "but Finland, 2023". Russia would have perhaps prevented that too, if their forces were not overstretched in Ukraine. For now they've declared that Northern Europe has become "unstable":

Russia's Foreign Ministry said Moscow "will be forced to take military-technical and other retaliatory measures to counter the threats to our national security arising from Finland’s accession to NATO.”

It said Finland's move marks "a fundamental change in the situation in Northern Europe, which had previously been one of the most stable regions in the world.”

In a 2022 speech, referencing Peter the Great's campaigns (against Sweden, but also around Narva, presently in Estonia) Putin said that (similarly) "it fell to our lot to return and reinforce as well" places where "from time immemorial, the Slavs lived". Anyhow, as of 2022, Putin was drawing a finer line between NATO candidates that Russia had territorial disputes with and those without:

“We don’t have problems with Sweden and Finland like we do with Ukraine,” the Russian president told a news conference in the Turkmenistan capital of Ashgabat. “We don’t have territorial differences.”

For the latter, in late 2021, Russia demanded a return to pre-1997 armed forces deployments in Europe, so that NATO's expansion since then would be, more or less, confined to paper.

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BTW, although the Q itself notes this to some extent, I should probably mention here that many European countries regard the CSCE/OSCE conference outputs as politically but not legally binding. Among the numerous principles declared in OSCE documents, Russia for instance likes and insists on the "indivisible security" one. In particular they raised it again in Feb 2022, shortly before invading Ukraine. And after the Georgia war, Medvedev proposed a European Security Treaty that would have raised the "indivisible security" principle to a legally binding status, but this was rejected by other countries, including Germany, who argued that it is too vague for such a role, and in fact (despite being in the same Istanbul declaration) rather contradictory with the freedom of countries to choose alliances:

German Minister of State Werner Hoyer noted the difficulties involved in attempting to make the principle of indivisible security into a mandatory legal requirement. “How, for example, does the concept of indivisible security fit with the freedom of countries to choose what alliances they belong to, something to which we are all committed?” he asked.

As noted by other analysts (in that paper), the 2009 Russian treaty draft in fact proposed to resolve this by making any other prior commitments subordinate to this "indivisible security" principle (via its Article 9), so essentially giving Russia, from then on, a legal veto over NATO expansion, troop deployments, etc., assuming NATO members would have signed on. Even the right to collective self-defense was made subordinate to the same "indivisible security" in this proposal. In case of being attacked, a signatory state retained the right to convene an Extraordinary Conference, where collective defense decisions had to be unanimous (minus the attacking country, if among the signatories). Needless to say that such a design favored big countries over small ones since the former could self-defend on their own, an action which did not need Conference approval.

The 1999 Istanbul joint ministerial statement even contained some rather more concrete commitments like (p. 50)

19. [...] We welcome the commitment by the Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of the Russian forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002.

Which, of course, has yet to happen even 20 years later, and was a bone of contention in some later OSCE summits e.g. in 2010.

Answer 4

Others have answered this question more broadly, ignoring the context you asked it in - namely, the Istanbul document, which was a result of the Istanbul summit.

Just as you have focused on one relevant clause of importance to you in the document (i.e. article 8 that talks about security alliances) there does seem to be a political misunderstanding between all the parties involved on what they consider to be the most relevant / important part / clauses of the document.

For Russia, with reference to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the most important part (emphasised) are in article 8 and 9:

8. Each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. Each State also has the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.

9. We will build our relations in conformity with the concept of common and comprehensive security, guided by equal partnership, solidarity and transparency. The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others. We will address the human, economic, political and military dimensions of security as an integral whole.

Art. 8,9, Charter for European Security in 1999 OSCE Istanbul Document p.3

This is also what Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told the US:

Lavrov told reporters that Russia's stance was based on a 1999 charter signed in Istanbul by members of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which includes the United States and Canada.

The charter says countries should be free to choose their own security arrangements and alliances, but goes on to say that they "will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other states".

... "Our western colleagues are simply trying not even to ignore but to consign to oblivion this key principle of international law agreed in the Euro-Atlantic space," Lavrov told reporters. - Russia cites 1999 charter text for insistence on 'indivisible security' (Feb 2022).

So it appears that the political misunderstanding here is that Ukraine is giving importance to the clause about joining alliances, Russia was giving primacy to the clause that such alliances need to consider the security concerns of others while the Anglosphere / NATO focused more on the part that OSCE countries cannot create or claim a "sphere of influence" (which it believed Russia was doing with Eastern Europeon countries).

(I'll leave it to the readers, and historians, to decide if this political misunderstanding is a deliberate farce or an unintentional tragedy).

Answer 5

To answer the part about "Why does Russia see NATO as an aggressor", we must go back to the same year 1999. In 1999, at least according to Russian point of view, NATO attacked Yugoslavia. Then there were Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. All of these actions are seen by Russia, and countries outside the Western world, as NATO aggression.

As mentioned in some other answer, 1999 Yeltsin was president. He and the majority of his government were relative pro Western, which explains why they signed this document.

Answer 6

Russia does not recognise the sovereignty of the other Soviet republics, considers them all "historically part of Russia", and ESPECIALLY Belarus and Ukraine are considered such, as well as the Baltic states.

It's basically the same ploy that China uses to claim ownership of Taiwan, parts of Japan, the Philippines, and other countries.

Russia is also extremely paranoid about any of their neighbours, and considers any neighbour who is not under their complete control to be an enemy by definition. As NATO was set up explicitly to curb Soviet/Russian aggression it's Moscow's main boogeyman so any country daring to want to join NATO (or even have friendly relations with them) is considered a major threat.

This is reflected in repeated Russian demands that the Baltic states and all former Warsaw Pact nations leave NATO and completely demilitarise, which not only removes them as a potential threat but obviously also leaves them open for invasion and inclusion into Russia proper.

Answer 7

You've confused two separate issues.

NATO expansion into Eastern Europe shows NATO is untrustworthy, not that it is aggressive. This is not inconsistent with the Istanbul document you cited, since that only says countries are free to apply. It does not say countries have to be accepted (note NATO denied membership to Russia itself). Since NATO promised not to expand, and then didn't deny membership, it shows NATO cannot be trusted.

NATO is an aggressor because it (or its ideological leaders) attacked Libya, Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.

Answer 8

One option is that Russia sees NATO's acceptance of those countries' membership as irresponsible, even as it does not deny these countries' right to participate. In the triangle of Russia, Eastern European countries and NATO, Russia sees the latter as the main culprit.

The question itself is misguided in the sense that Ukraine is not a part of NATO and is not being accepted to NATO in forseeable future. So even if Russia considers NATO an aggressor for something, it's definitely not for accepting Ukraine into NATO.