It's hard to see what Israel has to gain from the visit, and Israel's public support for Ukraine seems to have been modest from the outset.
One dimension of the problem is that Israel has a good relationship with Putin's Russia, and in recent years there has been a degree of cooperation in pacifying and solidifying the Middle East region.
Syria in particular was liquefied by the West in a disastrous and incoherent campaign against Assad, in which the West ended up backing all sides in the fighting at various times. This is on Israel's doorstep.
Western sanctions against Russia which have ensued from the Ukraine war, are also inconvenient for Israel because it has somewhat driven its friend Russia, into the arms of Israel's foe Iran.
Another dimension is that it's not easy to fathom the basis for the "solidarity" between Israel and Ukraine. The status of Ukraine in their conflict against Russia arguably bears more in common with Palestine against Israel, than with Israel against Palestine.
Both Russia and Israel use a rationale of historic possession (ancient, in Israel's case), and legitimate contemporary interests, as a justification for annexation of territory. The only real difference is that Russia is absorbing the Ukrainian people, whereas Israel largely does not want to absorb the Palestinians, but to exile them instead.
Certainly, the matter is confused enough that it does Israel no good to encourage further examination and drawing of parallels.
A third dimension is that Ukraine potentially competes with Israel for attention, sympathy, and aid money from the West—especially in the eyes of the Jewish diaspora, given that Zelensky is Jewish, although (unlike Israel) his regime doesn't claim to be Jewish in character.
A fourth dimension is that Israel is aided by the influx of refugees from Ukraine and would wish them to settle there permanently, and so it does not necessarily have an interest in the resolution of the Ukraine war being in Ukraine's favour, if that leads to an outflow of population again.
And a final dimension is that Russia's successful conquest of Ukraine may set a useful precedent for Israel's own annexations of Palestine—either in terms of the status quo borders, or the entire desired territory.
All this comes to a total that Israel would prefer not to be compared to Ukraine or be seen to be in an alliance with Ukraine.
At best, they may wish Zelensky well, but prefer not to be bound into a collective (which will highlight contradictions, and create political and diplomatic rigidities that Israel may not want), but there's also grounds to think Israel may have ambiguous views about which way they really want the Ukraine war to go.