Well, we can infer some of Netanyahu's war aims from his past positions, observing Israeli actions and comparing them to past Israeli strategies. Additionally, while we cannot "read his mind", Israel is a democracy and Bibi doesn't carry the final word a la Putin. A year into this war, it's not unreasonable to ask what the plans are. This answer will mostly concentrate on Gaza as it seems more problematic long term than Iran/Lebanon. ##### 1. Deterrence This is a frequent word in the [Israeli press][1]. The word speaks for itself, it is meant to convince, by force, Gazans not to attack Israel. ##### 2. No Palestinian state, ever. That has been Netanyahu's long term position and there are no indications he's changed it. Even for a different Israeli leader, selling such a state to the electorate would be difficult after 10/7. ##### 3. Kill Sinwar, and the other 10/7 planners. Sinwar aside, [this has been mostly carried out][2]. [See also][3] Bibi could certainly expect a big political boost from bagging Sinwar. ##### 4. Dislodge Hamas from power in Gaza and/or get the population to revolt. Get more amenable Palestinian leaders. There have been talks for example of boosting the power of Gaza clans and families. Hamas has been vigilant in rooting dissent out however. ##### 5. Destroy Hamas combat brigades IIRC Hamas started out with about 10 combat brigades and Israel has tried hard to reduce them. That was one of the reasons to attack the [Khan Younis area][4], 4-5 months back, as the last 3 or 4 were lodged there. The trouble with this approach is that while the IDF can, and has, smashed any organized resistance at a given location, it cannot enforce destruction and control of the terrain durably. Look around press coverage and you will quickly see [articles of the IDF redeploying to areas they had cleared before][5]. The tunnels (pooh poohed by some earlier) are probably a big help there. ##### 6. Establish durable security control in Gaza to prevent future arms buildups. Netanyahu has talked about [keeping an IDF presence][6]. That tends to be badly received by the Americans who would prefer Fatah. Something Bibi emphatically refuses. Fatah, for itself, has expressed extreme aversion to coming in on behalf of the Israelis. ##### 7. Perhaps most importantly, biding for time. The situation in Gaza is far from brilliant. And Netanyahu has so far failed to articulate exactly what he considers "good enough" to stop. But it is not existentially problematic to the IDF and if the food blockage claims didn't cause a rupture with the West, continued lower intensity operations likely won't. Maybe something will turn things around? And, there is always the possibility of having a very friendly Trump presidency next year. Stopping in Gaza now would risk looking like weakness and confirming failure. His hard right allies have stated they would drop their support, thus collapsing his government. The more moderate want his scalp for allowing 10/7 in the first place. Stopping would also force looking at providing reconstruction for what after all remains an Israeli-controlled region. It's like [teaching a horse to sing][7]. -------- After 10/7, a number of these points would be understandable (at least, if one doesn't look too closely at the 41000 Gazans so far). However #2, no Palestinian state, ever, gives Gazans very little to live for. Yes, at some point they may cease fighting on this current round. But either Israel will have to maintain a police presence to keep the peace or they will eventually rearm. Gazans are on the whole a very young population, living under very harsh conditions. They can't leave and everyone has people close to them who got killed. Young men will keep on getting killed while trying to kill their enemies. So the deterrence aspect is questionable, unless Israel is even more coercive, which may result in ever-dropping Western backing. While it is not that surprising to see European criticism, even the US, especially amongst younger generations has seen unprecedented criticism. Make no mistake: this isn't a standard guerrilla war. On the current system, Israeli's can't "go home", like the US did in Nam and Afghanistan, the Soviet in Afghanistan or the French in Algeria. -------- Lebanon and Iran however seem like they would be more manageable. The Lebanese don't have nearly as much skin in the game as the Gazans, the country is nearly a failed state and Hezbollah's adventures may come to be unappreciated by Sunnis and Christians. The IDF and Hezbollah slugged it out in 2006 and Israel did establish deterrence. So far, 2024 has started out way better for the IDF, but it's early days and there are supposedly still a lot of missiles. Iran, as long as it is non-nuclear, is 1000km away, and has no air force. Its government may want to sit out a full out fight, as it itself has its own problems. Israel could certainly hurt it badly. In any case, unlike with Gaza and the West Bank, Israel is much more likely to get the benefit of the doubt from Western nations. So, while I caution it is way too early to have much confidence, the idea of successful deterrence seems more achievable wrt Lebanon and Iran. [1]: https://www.israelhayom.com/2024/01/23/winning-is-incomplete-without-deterrence/ [2]: https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/31/who-are-the-hamas-and-hezbollah-leaders-killed-since-7-october-attack [3]: https://www.timesofisrael.com/which-hezbollah-and-hamas-terror-leaders-have-been-taken-out-since-october-7/ [4]: https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-withdraws-ground-troops-from-south-gaza-leaving-just-one-brigade-in-enclave/ [5]: https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/13/middleeast/israel-restarts-fighting-north-gaza-military-strategy-mime-intl/index.html [6]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67345430 [7]: https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/877324-one-of-your-most-ancient-writers-a-historian-named-herodotus