42

you could be given a randomly generated GUID which can identify your vote, but cannot be reversed engineered to identify you, unless you tell someone else what your vote GUID This seems absurd to me, its trivial to steal or brute force that. Brute force a GUID? No. Steal, yes, that's the problem: any ID of sufficient length will be impossible for most ...


34

I don't see what blockchain has to do with GUIDs and there seems to be some context lost in the edits. In either case, I recommend taking a look at this voting software related XKCD. Most experts agree with that XKCD comic. Giving a voter a unique, random GUID makes it impossible to identify a voter based on a GUID - that is, if you ignore other vectors. ...


30

What you're describing sounds like a form of liquid democracy - described by Blum & Zuber (2016)1 as: a procedure for collective decision-making that combines direct democratic participation with a flexible account of representation. Its basic model consists of four components that can be stated as follows: All members of a political community that ...


24

No, it's not possible. At least, not without violating multiple fundamental principles of democracy or making it seriously vulnerable. This is primarily because of the authenticity vs. voter anonymity problem. Consider this: A voter must be a citizen (Authentic) Their voting choices must not be known, especially not on a public ledger (Anonymous) The vote ...


19

The security issues in electronic voting are completely unlike any security issues anywhere else. You have to provide assurance that every legal vote has been correctly recorded and added to the total of the candidate for whom it was cast, but at the same time prevent any voter from proving to a third party which way they voted. These two are fundamentally ...


11

The whole field of electronic voting is rather dubious in general. Many places outperform US vote counting speed using paper ballots and without the added concern, whether justified or only perceived, about hacking that arise with electronic voting. All the more since USA software vendors in that space aren't typically known for their transparency and ...


11

E-Estonia Estonia has invested heavily in internet infrastructure in a set of policies called E-Estonia. As part of this, Estonia has declared internet access a human right and strongly emphasizes streamlining conventional governmental processes through information technology. Additionally, each Estonian has an electronic national ID card which is used ...


10

One of the main problems is that in most countries voting is anonymous. It's hard to find a way that people can vote online, without authentication (because anyone can only vote 1 time) and assure that the vote is not bound to an identity. Hacking is also a major drawback, as regular voting is highly decentralised in most countries. That makes it hard to ...


10

Traceability at an individual vote cast level is basically a useless feature. The reason you want some means to audit whether a vote has been recorded properly is to determine if a vote total is accurate. But if only individuals can trace how their vote was calculated, then unless everyone waived secrecy in order to trace how their vote was recorded and then ...


10

Suspicion of electronic vote tampering is widespread, and those suspicions are reasonable, if perhaps not immediately validated by recorded incidents (that I am aware of). The history of election fraud, with its many techniques and variations, is pretty rich -- people have been trying to steal elections since elections were invented. We can safely assume ...


7

Possibly It all depends on the protocol. Luke Briggs' answer does a great job of stating the requirements for such a protocol and shows a protocol that wouldn't work. The question is whether there is a protocol that could meet the requirements. I don't believe one has been found but one can get quite close by adding indirection. Below is a protocol that I'...


6

I think the fact that you never eliminate candidates could be a problem - in same cases you won't even get a result. Let's say you have 10 candidates trying for 5 slots, and 1000 votes. Each candidate gets between 50-150 votes. But 150 is less then the quota (using the Droop method, the quota would be 1000/[5+1] + 1 = 167) Nobody meets the quota - so ...


6

The biggest problem that I see with this is that it is possible to get different results in a recount. So I would never recommend it for a government election. You'd have politicians trying to game the system to get the "right" recount. One might argue that there are often random tiebreakers, but these operate at the end of the process. So everyone can ...


6

In the Presidential election of 2000 (Bush v. Gore), the election was so close that it was decided by less than 600 votes in Florida out of a voting pool of tens of millions. Enter: the hanging chad. Paper ballots utilized a punch-card system in which the voter stuck a metal instrument through the bubble representing their desired candidate, and the ...


5

The Wisconsin Elections Commission did publish a Recount Manual for the 2016 Presidential Election. The basis for requesting a recount: The basis for requesting the recount. This can consist of a general statement that the petitioner believes that a mistake or fraud was committed in a specified ward or municipality in the counting and return of the votes ...


5

The main two problems are security-related. Auditability Auditability (that is, the ability to recount votes when results get challenged) is the most important problem by far for elections that matter. With physical ballots, you can always recount the results; and, in theory at least, the ballots get stored for years. With electronic votes, any amount of ...


5

Sort of. There have been a few trials, the most prominent of which was the usage by the state of West Virginia in the 2018 midterm elections, which saw 144 overseas voters vote using a phone app which utilized blockchain technology. However, in 2019, the trial was denigrated in an article by Slate, which pointed out that officials had yet to share the ...


4

One key feature of elections is trust in the counting method. Which makes choosing your own system a bit of an issue - not least given the flaws people are picking up on. There are bodies (such as the UK Electoral Reform Society) with >100 years experience of doing this. They publish a guide on using STV including detailed instructions on how to run a count....


4

Desired Features I think one needs to see what are the features that one wants for an election in general, and see how different systems cope with it. An election should provide: transparency: all the process of vote, and counting has to be verifiable by any citizen. independent vote: all the citizens can vote according to their opinions, without external ...


4

First, voting methods, such as EVM are primarily a state and local function rather than a federal function, although federal regulation and funding are permitted. Second, the current administration opposes such funding in its budget, in part, because that would admit that there was a problem in the 2016 election which could cast doubt on its legitimacy.


4

One factor that hasn't been explained is the number of elections happening at the same time. Many European countries (Germany very much included) hold one or two elections per year (with a phased calendar in the case of German local and provincial elections), where people elect one person or one body. In the US, you have literally hundreds of races, ...


4

The phenomenon you're describing is often called the spoiler effect, where similar candidates in a plurality based race end up impeding each other. One common measure of whether a voting system is susceptible to this effect is the "independence of clones criterion", where the winner doesn't change if another option is added which is identical (or very ...


4

First point, the 68.05% number is sloppy, if not completely specious. The author notes that there were "15,676 individual events" recorded in the tabulation log, but doesn't specify what an event is in this context. I assume that an 'event' is any pertinent action performed by a user or the machine and recorded in the log, but regardless an 'event' ...


3

In addition to the above answers, blockchain and public ledgers can be combined with mail-in voting to create a better mail-in voting system. The USPS is filing a patent for a blockchain system that could help with mail-in-voting to add more security and make said votes easier to count. According to the patent itself, the system works when “a registered ...


3

This seems relatively easy to defeat. if (ELECTION_DAY == date) { make_my_candidate_win(); restore_executable_from_backup(); } else { count_results_correctly(); } That said, that they run test ballots during a recount does not prove or even suggest that they don't do it before the actual election. If anything, it suggests that they do do it ...


3

Like everything else with elections, this varies state-by-state. This page has a list of what kind of machine each state uses (more detailed and up-to-date map here), but there are effectively five kinds: Optical Scan - Just like standardized testing: Voter marks the ballot, then a machine scans it and counts it. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) - Voter ...


3

There is a fairly large body of research on the effects of polling on elections — including the effects of exit polling — which tends to support the existence of strategic voting and the bandwagon effect. In short, people will read polls and change their voting behavior on the fly: moving their vote to some second-best candidate who has a better chance of ...


3

It does everything but count; validates, potentially rejects, and makes the selection machine-readable. It's basically the same step as a teacher would use to grade a test with an answer key overlay; marking which questions were answered right and wrong. This is the step before counting the totals and assigning a grade, which is basically what the tabulator ...


3

In general it's a bad idea to ask questions about ongoing investigations. All I can tell you is that AG of Michigan has labelled that report as not credible: Attorney General Dana Nessel and Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson, in an Antrim County court hearing today, did not object to the public release of a report on Dominion software from the partisan ...


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