42

you could be given a randomly generated GUID which can identify your vote, but cannot be reversed engineered to identify you, unless you tell someone else what your vote GUID This seems absurd to me, its trivial to steal or brute force that. Brute force a GUID? No. Steal, yes, that's the problem: any ID of sufficient length will be impossible for most ...


34

I don't see what blockchain has to do with GUIDs and there seems to be some context lost in the edits. In either case, I recommend taking a look at this voting software related XKCD. Most experts agree with that XKCD comic. Giving a voter a unique, random GUID makes it impossible to identify a voter based on a GUID - that is, if you ignore other vectors. ...


30

What you're describing sounds like a form of liquid democracy - described by Blum & Zuber (2016)1 as: a procedure for collective decision-making that combines direct democratic participation with a flexible account of representation. Its basic model consists of four components that can be stated as follows: All members of a political community that ...


19

The security issues in electronic voting are completely unlike any security issues anywhere else. You have to provide assurance that every legal vote has been correctly recorded and added to the total of the candidate for whom it was cast, but at the same time prevent any voter from proving to a third party which way they voted. These two are fundamentally ...


11

The whole field of electronic voting is rather dubious in general. Many places outperform US vote counting speed using paper ballots and without the added concern, whether justified or only perceived, about hacking that arise with electronic voting. All the more since USA software vendors in that space aren't typically known for their transparency and ...


10

Traceability at an individual vote cast level is basically a useless feature. The reason you want some means to audit whether a vote has been recorded properly is to determine if a vote total is accurate. But if only individuals can trace how their vote was calculated, then unless everyone waived secrecy in order to trace how their vote was recorded and then ...


4

First point, the 68.05% number is sloppy, if not completely specious. The author notes that there were "15,676 individual events" recorded in the tabulation log, but doesn't specify what an event is in this context. I assume that an 'event' is any pertinent action performed by a user or the machine and recorded in the log, but regardless an 'event' ...


3

In addition to the above answers, blockchain and public ledgers can be combined with mail-in voting to create a better mail-in voting system. The USPS is filing a patent for a blockchain system that could help with mail-in-voting to add more security and make said votes easier to count. According to the patent itself, the system works when “a registered ...


3

In general it's a bad idea to ask questions about ongoing investigations. All I can tell you is that AG of Michigan has labelled that report as not credible: Attorney General Dana Nessel and Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson, in an Antrim County court hearing today, did not object to the public release of a report on Dominion software from the partisan ...


2

Blockchains or public ledgers are (perhaps) half of a solution. Blockchains are a technology, and technology by itself cannot solve social problems, any more than construction equipment by itself can build a city. The social problem implicit in the franchise is the tension between accountability and secrecy, and while blockchains help to ensure secrecy, they ...


2

Not in the US, because it inherently requires voter ID. In the modern US, voter ID is a politicised topic that is the subject of active debate, with one party being vehemently opposed to it as they consider it a form of voter suppression, and the other party advocating for it in order to reduce voter fraud. As a result, a scheme that requires all voters to ...


1

It is possible to have both voter privacy & traceability. Here is just one academic article (among many) describing how you can use bisimulation & graph theory to mathematically prove the correctness of privacy properties of electronic voting protocols is here. The cryptography behind the scenes is quite complex. The protocols can provide plausible ...


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