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Sinwar aside, this has been mostly carried out. See also Netanyahu could certainly expect a big political boost from bagging Sinwar.

Sinwar was killed soon after I posted this answer, but this goal had already mostly been achieved when I wrote it, with a number of other high ranking Hamas leaders eliminated. See also.

Iran, as long as it is non-nuclear, is 1000km away, and has no air force. Its government may want to sit out a full out fight, as it itself has its own problems. Israel could certainly hurt it badly. In any case, unlike with Gaza and the West Bank, Israel is much more likely to get the benefit of the doubt from Western nations.

There are risks: ground invasions in Lebanon can bog down, whacking Lebanon too hard can backfire wrt world opinion and Iron Dome defenses are susceptible to saturation attacks (I find it hard to believe, but the number of 150k rockets, before October, was peddled for Hezbollah).

p.s. "exit strategy", as opposed to "goals" or "aims" seems the wrong term. An exit strategy is not the goal a country goes to war with, it is a what you consider to be your minimum results allowing you to leave, after your initial goals have clearly failed. The US was looking for an exit strategy in Vietnam and Afghanistan. The USSR in Afghanistan. Israel from South Lebanon in the 80s. Russia (or Ukraine) may look for one in the future. Talking about an exit strategy with regards to Lebanon is quite premature given that the war there is less than month old. Israel isn't at that stage at this point, even in Gaza.

Iran, as long as it is non-nuclear, is 1000km away, and has no air force that can realistically threaten Israel, though its missile force has the capacity to inflict some level of deliberate civilian casualties on Israel (lessened by widespread availability of bomb shelters and Iran's reliance on mostly long-prep liquid-fuelled IRBMs). Its government may want to sit out a full out fight, as it itself has its own problems and has regional rivals. Israel could certainly hurt it, though that will also be limited by distance. In any case, unlike with Gaza and the West Bank and even Lebanon, in the domain of public sympathy, Israel is much more likely to get the benefit of the doubt from Western nations when targeting Iran.

There are risks: ground invasions in Lebanon can bog down, whacking Lebanon too hard can backfire wrt world opinion (especially if the methods to do so are controversial) and Iron Dome defenses are susceptible to saturation attacks and cost asymmetries (I find it hard to believe, but the number of 150k rockets, before October, was claimed for Hezbollah). Iran can also threaten to disrupt the oil trade and that's probably one of its better points of leverage.

p.s. "exit strategy", as opposed to "goals" or "aims" seems the wrong term. An exit strategy is not the goal a country goes to war with, it is a what you consider to be your minimum results allowing you to leave, after your initial goals have clearly failed. The US was looking for an exit strategy in Vietnam and Afghanistan. The USSR in Afghanistan. Israel from South Lebanon in the 80s. Russia (or Ukraine) may look for one in the future.

Talking about an "exit strategy" with regards to Lebanon is quite premature given that the war there is less than a month old. Israel isn't at that stage at this point, even in Gaza.

There are risks: ground invasions in Lebanon can bog down, whacking Lebanon too hard can backfire wrt world opinion and Iron Dome defenses are susceptible to saturation attacks (I find it hard to believe, but the number of 150k missiles, before October, was peddled for Hezbollah).

There are risks: ground invasions in Lebanon can bog down, whacking Lebanon too hard can backfire wrt world opinion and Iron Dome defenses are susceptible to saturation attacks (I find it hard to believe, but the number of 150k rockets, before October, was peddled for Hezbollah).