One of the perhaps lesser known facts about the [now fallen] Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is that the model of democracy promoted by the US there was quite unlike what they did in Iraq nearly simultaneously.
The UN-sponsored Bonn Conference of 2001 established the political foundations of the Afghan republic, reinstating the 1964 Constitution as the interim basic law and selecting Hamid Karzai as the interim political leader. That constitution was the product of Afghanistan’s experiment with constitutional democracy under King Muhammad Zahir Shah (1933–73). Although it had democratic elements, it was an authoritarian document designed merely to provide citizens some breathing room. [...] Some factions of the Northern Alliance (one of four Afghan groups to participate at Bonn), however, resisted and asked for a more decentralized system to accommodate Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic makeup. But the old unitary system was alluring to the Afghan leaders as well as to the international community.
In 2004, a Constitutional Loya Jirga (Grand Council) promulgated a new basic law that departed from the 1964 Constitution most significantly in calling for a democratically elected president. The 2004 Constitution not only reinstated an old system of government, but it also resurrected the old administrative regulations governing public finance, the bureaucracy, the police, and other key elements of a functioning state. Many of these regulations had been strongly influenced by the Soviet Union, whose own attempts at institution-building in Afghanistan began in the 1950s and were not democratic. These top-down rules, which went mostly unnoticed by the international community, also severely limited the state’s ability to project power outside the capital.
[...] Consequently, parliament was much weaker than the president, who possessed vast constitutional powers, including the power to appoint ministers, Supreme Court justices, and all provincial- and district-level officials.
[...] In Herat Province in 2007, for example, I found a community that was electing its traditional leaders via secret ballot. This was ironic given that after 2001, citizens were never granted the opportunity to elect their formal local leaders, who were all appointed by Kabul.
[...] When pressed about the need for a weaker executive, such as a prime minister, or greater decentralization of authority, U.S. ambassador Robert Finn said that “Afghanistan needed a strong president given all the vectors of power.”
So, except for the national-level elections, of which only the presidential one was truly determinative, everything else more or less worked on a Soviet system, with a US rubber stamp, despite apparent pressures from below for a more decentralized model.
My question is whether this model of democracy that was tried in Afghanistan, with no local/provincial elections, just national ones and everything else top-down appointed by the president, work well anywhere, for a significant amount of time?