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There's this quote from Ukrainian FM Kuleba doing the rounds on social media, essentially talking about a quid-pro-quo: more Patriots in exchange for less attacks on Russian oil infrastructure (which the US opposes):

You have to think in your own interests. If partners say, 'We're giving you seven Patriot batteries tomorrow, but we're asking you not to do this and this and this,' then there's something to talk about. And if you don't have those batteries, there is no aid package and at the same time you are asked not to do something, then there is nothing to talk about? Then everyone survives as they can.

(Yeah, Kuleba isn't explicit about the 'something' there, but it seems everyone understood that he's talking about attacks on Russian oil and gas infrastructure.)

Is the US acknowledging that they're losing some leverage over Ukraine by cutting off aid?

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  • That style of escalation is a trick that may work for Netanyahu, who has half a dozen US air bases shielding him from retaliation of a less capable foe. Zelensky's administration does not have the same luxury, but seems just as confident. Previous episodes of tit-for-tat striking into prewar Russia cost them a good chunk of the country's electric grid, so that's an indication of where it will continue to go. The US gov should be happy that someone else is taking the blame for this, so I'd look for statements by Kirby that Kiev is acting independently. Take with a grain of salt.
    – Pete W
    Commented Apr 16 at 1:03
  • @PeteW Ukraine is just getting a little desperate because they're in a bit of a bind, running out of ammunition with a Russian offensive seemingly just around the corner. They can't really make the situation much worse at this point, when there's a realistic chance that the capital of Ukraine will be Moscow in a year or so. So they seem to be betting that if they make Russia angry enough, it will do something dumb which will make the West stop dithering and come with some sort of a response.
    – TooTea
    Commented Apr 16 at 19:33
  • For the US to admit that they're losing leverage they need to have admitted they had it in the first place. So, did the US expressly acknowledge that they have "leverage" over Ukraine? If they did, it'll be interesting to see the quote. If they didn't, then the question is based on an implied premise without proof.
    – Greendrake
    Commented Apr 17 at 4:34

4 Answers 4

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Let's start with some facts:

  1. Ukraine needs external aid to win (or not lose) the war. Should be obvious. They're currently struggling while US aid is held up.

  2. The Europeans are unable / unwilling to provide the necessary aid to Ukraine alone. The EU's €50B for Ukraine is basically nothing.

  3. Europe has historically counted on US to extend its nuclear umbrella over the continent. Losing access to that nuclear umbrella - e.g. if Trump wins the election and then encourages Russia to attack NATO members who don't spend 2% GDP on defense - is terrifying for the Europeans.

When you add up all these facts, you reach this one:

  1. Like it or not, unless they are willing to accept a Russian victory, Ukraine (and Europe) needs the US.

This might change someday if the EU decides the "peace dividend" (due to the USSR collapse) is over, and allocates more funding for defense. If the EU+UK eventually get to the point where they don't need the US to help defend Ukraine, then the US would be losing leverage by cutting off aid. Until then, cutting off aid demonstrates in stark terms how badly Ukraine (and Europe) needs the US, which increases the US leverage, not decreases it.

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    Note that the politico headline you quoted is just an overdramatized click-bait. From the same article: "Brussels and Washington have been Ukraine’s biggest financial backers, each handing out €27.5 billion and €22.9 billion between the start of the Kremlin’s invasion on February 24, 2022 and the end of last year." So €50 billion over the last 2 years was enough to get to the status quo and more than half of that came from the EU.
    – quarague
    Commented Apr 16 at 6:25
  • @quarague While the EU is perfectly capable of collecting some money and sending it over to Ukraine to prop up its government budget, it's much less capable of supplying the front with a steady stream of weapons. So at least in that regard Ukraine still very much needs the US. For some mysterious reason, EU car factories still haven't switched over to mass production of drones.
    – TooTea
    Commented Apr 16 at 8:20
  • @TooTea I agree that it is much easier with US help and that the EU commitments on their own may be insufficient. But that is not that the same as saying the EU contribution is 'basically nothing', especially if the requested US contribution is approximately the same as the EU one.
    – quarague
    Commented Apr 16 at 8:24
  • The Q is about Ukraine. I suppose you're arguing that the US nuke umbrella extends to them, that's why Russia hasn't gone nuclear on them. YMMV. Anyhow, even the rest of the argument wrt Europe isn't w/o caveats. How quickly can Germany make nukes? wsj.com/world/europe/… Etc. Commented Apr 16 at 8:59
  • @thegodsfromengineering EU already has nukes (c.f. France and UK). I'm not sure I understand what you are saying.
    – Allure
    Commented Apr 16 at 9:15
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There's this quote from Ukrainian FM Kuleba doing the rounds on social media, essentially talking about a quid-pro-quo: more Patriots in exchange for less attacks on Russian oil infrastructure (which the US opposes)

This is not an accurate description of why the U.S. is not currently sending more aid to Ukraine. It is a tempest in a teapot side issue.

Is the US acknowledging that they're losing some leverage over Ukraine by cutting off aid?

The question seems to assume that the U.S. speaks with one voice on issues like aid to Ukraine and that cutting off aid is a unified rational choice. Of course, that isn't how U.S. politics work. Political power is much more widely distributed than in countries with parliamentary systems of government that fit the kind of governance model that the question assumes. The key decision makers in the U.S. government are currently divided, leading to gridlock, which is the default mode of American politics.

The U.S. in not a monolith. The loss of leverage is widely acknowledged by advocates of U.S. aid to Ukraine. The loss of leverage is ignored by opponents U.S. aid to Ukraine, some of whom are pro-Russia or at least not pro-Ukraine, and many of whom feel that the U.S. has no business involving itself in foreign wars to which it is not a party at the expense of U.S. taxpayers.

The Biden administration is doing everything it can to get aid to Ukraine, despite its desire to have some mild influence on one tiny part of Ukrainian military strategy related to strikes on Russian oil facilities.

So is Republican House Speaker Johnson, along with a majority of House Republicans.

So is the Democratic party minority in the House and the Democratic party majority in the Senate.

But Republican conservatives in the House, who make up a minority of House Republicans, don't want the U.S. to authorize more aid to Ukraine and are preventing the U.S. from taking action to provide more Ukraine aid. They have the power to do so because they have the votes to remove Republican House Speaker Johnson from office if he moves forward on Ukraine aid without their tacit consent or at least without their strong objections.

The opposition of conservative House Republicans to Ukraine aid has essentially nothing to do with a desire to prevent Ukraine from striking Russian oil fields. Their opposition to this aid is instead driven by domestic political attitudes towards foreign military aid and Russia generally. Some Republicans, at least, have rethought their historical opposition to all forms of military actions by Russia and Russian proxy wars that was an article of faith for them during the Cold War. They did so after President Trump took a more conciliatory attitude towards Russia.

Senate Republicans are breathing a sigh of relief that this issue, which is a source of division within their political party, isn't their problem yet since spending bills have to start in the House. Some Senate Republicans support Ukraine aid and others do not. But the number of Senate Republicans who support Ukraine aid is large enough, in combination with Senate Democrats who support Ukraine aid, to overcome a Republican filibuster of spending for this purpose. And, as a minority party in the Senate, Senate Republican have little control of the agenda unlike Republicans in the House.

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From the press sources I observe (New York Times, The Guardian, Financial Times, Meduza, Novaya Gazeta EU) I am under impression that USA representatives are currently not making such statements. Ukraine, itself, however likely does (Washington Post):

Zelensky brushed off the recommendation

from the USA to stop the attacks on Russian oil refineries. These strikes drive up global oil prices but for a country struggling for survival this does not look like a thing to care about.

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Is the US acknowledging that they're losing some leverage over Ukraine by cutting off aid?

What leverage do you exactly mean?

The US maybe concerned what a desperate Ukraine is likely to do, but they know that they do not lose any political leverage on Ukraine.

Let's consider the hard political reality of Ukraine today.

Ukraine needs the US more than the US needs Ukraine. Without the US economic and military support, Ukraine cannot survive as a state. So really, Ukraine cannot do anything but follow US terms, now or in the near future. The threat of no economic or military aid is a frightening prospect for Ukraine.

Europe is unlikely to do anything without US backing, as NATO will not act without the US.

Even if Zelensky has painted himself into a corner with the law barring any negotiations with Putin, the US knows that even if he were to try to talk to Russians, without US permission, to get back some political leverage on the US, he would killed or overthrown and replaced quickly by another pro-western Ukranian leader. (Not to mention that Russians themselves aren't interested in negotiating with Ukraine but their "backers" - NATO. They know that any deal Zelensky makes, can be immediately torn up by the next Ukranian leader. That is why they are demanding "western guarantees" to the any deal with Ukraine).

Then there's the economic leverage that the US has over Ukraine. It is unclear how much of the economic or military aid that the US has provided is actually unconditional or a simple loan.

So the answer to your question is that Ukraine has no political leverage at all, and it will have to do what the US tells it to do - until, at least, till the war is over.

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    "Ukrainian diplomats worked hard to extend the Lend-Lease program beyond September 2023, but it expired on September 30.[2] As of October 1, 2023, the act has been terminated since the fiscal year of 2023 has been over, without any use of Lend-Lease.[3]" --wikipedia. Commented Apr 17 at 20:08
  • @thegodsfromengineering Are you saying that the Ukrainians no longer owe the US anything for the aid given so far (under the since expired lend-lease act)?
    – sfxedit
    Commented Apr 17 at 20:12
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    Yes, there's only a 'moral debt' for aid. Nothing was actually given under Lend-Lease to Ukraine. Not that (e.g.) the USSR paid back most its WW2 lend-lease (they repaid only around 25%, IIRC.) Commented Apr 17 at 20:14
  • @thegodsfromengineering I have temporarily removed reference to the lend-lease program while I explore this more.
    – sfxedit
    Commented Apr 17 at 20:57
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    OTOH the latest proposal from Johnson goes along what Trump asked for earlier, namely that future aid to Ukraine be a loan. And Trump was explicit that he wants that in case Ukraine decides to make a deal with Russia that he (or the US) doesn't approve of. Commented Apr 17 at 21:01

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