The Middle East is on the brink of regional war following the recent mass bombing of Beirut's southern suburb and assassination of Hezbollah's Secretary General by Israel. The situation in the region is rapidly deteriorating and there's no knowing where things are going.
How can the United Nations utilize its available options and powers to prevent further escalation and slipping into the abyss, and what are those options?
How can the United Nations utilize its available options and powers to prevent further escalation and slipping into the abyss, and what are those options?
All the U.N. can do is encourage the interested parties to talk. As a practical matter, there is really nothing else it can do. Any U.N. Security Council resolution would be vetoed by one or more of the permanent members.
What measures can the UN take to avert regional war in the Middle East?
None. That boat has sailed. There are multiple regional wars already in progress in the Middle East.
Also, despite the dire language in the question, it is not at all a given that de-escalation or preventing further armed conflict is a desirable end.
There is an emerging school of thought in the foreign affairs world that de-escalation and cease fires excessively prolong conflicts that might otherwise end with a decisive victory for one side or the other that would end the conflict, reducing the harm caused by it in the long run. The conflict between Israel and the Iranian proxy Hezbollah has been grinding away as a low level armed conflict for decades. Intervening to stop the conflict now could prevent it from coming to a decisive end that could bring about long term peace.
One of the leading academic articles making that case is Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War A Chance" 78(4) Foreign Affairs 36-44 (1999). Its abstract summarizes the argument as follows:
Since the establishment of the United Nations, great powers have rarely let small wars burn themselves out. Bosnia and Kosovo are the latest examples of this meddling. Conflicts are interrupted by a steady stream of cease-fires and armistices that only postpone war-induced exhaustion and let belligerents rearm and regroup. Even worse are U.N. refugee-relief operations and NGOs, which keep resentful populations festering in camps and sometimes supply both sides in armed conflicts. This well-intentioned interference only intensifies and prolongs struggles in the long run. The unpleasant truth is that war does have one useful function: it brings peace. Let it.
Ceasefires fail about 80% of the time, and are more prone to failure in some situations than others.
The case for taking this approach in the Gaza conflict has been made, for example, in a January 2024 article.
Allowing Israel to destroy a designated terrorist group that the country of Lebanon has been unable to stop from operating in its territory may be a preferable resolution, even if it means a brief period of escalation in an already decades old regional war.
Probably quite limited in the short run, before national fervors have gone down. Let's look at the ways the UN can stop wars, from most coercive to least.
That was actually what happened in the 1950 Korean war, which was fought by nominally UN-sanctioned forces. The Soviet delegation was off boycotting the UNSC when the vote happened. Won't happen again: any such moves would get vetoed by one of the 5 permanent members.
Sanctions against one or the other side have to happen at the UNSC level. The US will veto anything harsh against Israel. Russia anything too harsh on Hezbullah, which is backed by Iran, whom (that's a massive eyeroll) Russia depends on for weapons. Plus, world sentiment since the start of the 2023 Gaza War being what it is, anything too pro-Israel would likely result in a majority of UN member states being supportive of Russian vetoes.
UN resolutions are a dime a dozen. They can, but rarely do, really bite. The type that does are sanctions. Still, anything too punishing to one side would still get vetoed by its UNSC backers.
UN resolutions, once passed, hardly have a stellar track record of forcing change (Myanmar, North Korea...). Those that do often do so via armed interventions by motivated members (Iraq's booting out of Kuwait, for example. Or more controversially French-UK-US interpretations of the initial Libya one to boot out Gadaffi). Hard to envision any big country hitting any of the principals (Iran, Israel or Lebanon) here.
The UN can issue sternly-worded demands for the cessation of hostilities. The problem is that these are also ritually ignored in most conflicts. At this point, I suspect even the pope's (or other religious leaders') exhortations for peace carry more weight, as they may at least cause some reflection by some believers.
For that to happen, both sides in a conflict need to want to stop fighting.
Israel has no real reason - aside from world opinion - until such time as it has suffered large losses, destroyed Hezbollah rockets or forced Hezbollah to back down from targeting the Israeli border.
Hezbollah would lose face, massively, in Lebanon. Especially after its leader has been killed, on Sept 27th, 2024. They may yet change their mind later, but are not likely to want to back down now. In any case, they've publicly vowed revenge.
The UN works best when it is seen as good faith broker. Right or wrongly Israelis do not generally hold that opinion.
Then you have the opposite side, Hezbollah. They are not a state, they are a political entity within Lebanon. The Lebanese government, the natural interlocutor to the UN, is too militarily weak to impose much on Hezbollah. That's going to complicate things: what Lebanon, via its government, commits to, is not all that binding on Hezbollah.
Neither has resolution 1701, with the enforcement mechanisms put in place to date, managed to avoid the situation escalating in the first place.
Annan (note UN Secretary General at the time) asserted that "dismantling Hezbollah is not the direct mandate of the UN," which could only help Lebanon disarm the organization.[6] Annan then said on 25 August 2006, *"The understanding was that it would be the Lebanese who would disarm [Hezbollah]" and that "Obviously, if at some stage they need advice or some help from the international community and they were to approach us, we would consider it, but the troops are not going in there to disarm.
So, yes, the UN will probably be involved, and useful, once the immediate desires for conflict have abated somewhat on both sides. But probably not really until then.
Nothing basically.
Israel has shifted to a doctrine of decisive victory:
There have been questions over the practice known as “mowing the grass,” a strategy of attrition that involves repeated conflicts with enemy forces to restore temporary deterrence. In 2020, Lt. Gen. Aviv Kohavi, then Israel’s chief of staff, turned instead to a strategy he called “decisive victory.”
Last week, the current chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, told troops operating in the north that they should prepare for a ground maneuver in southern Lebanon, where they would “decisively destroy” the enemy there.
The US keeps talking about de-escalation, but what they mean by that is for Hezbollah to roll over and die or surrender. The (only) escalation that the US wants to prevent is from Iran and its allies.
The Secretary expressed full support for Israel's right to defend itself and its people against Iranian backed terrorist groups. Secretary Austin stressed that the United States is determined to prevent Iran and Iranian-backed partners and proxies from exploiting the situation or expanding the conflict.
Whenever the IDF kills someone in Hezbollah, the US says justice was served.
So the UN works as [intended]: it prevents the interests of the P5 from being affected by the rest. (Speaking of which: literally tearing up the UN charter has been popular over the ages.)
N.B., conversely
The US ambassador to the UN calls Iran's missile attack on Israel a "significant escalation" of tensions in the Middle East.
Linda Thomas-Greenfield says the council should take "immediate" action.
She calls for the UN to condemn Iran for the attack and impose "serious consequences".
I could not find a transcript of that yet, but Russia's UNSC rep essentially blamed Israel and the US for expanding the war to Lebanon, Yemen, etc. He condemned the killing of Nasrallah and said that Israel bears the "full responsibility" for the "resulting escalation". No more explicit mention of Iran's missile strike, as such. Immediately he mentions the number of times that US has used veto in re Middle East. Hint, hint. Then he says something from the Western/Ukraine talk register, that Israel (wrongly) imagined it could escape unscathed.
To quote the US ambassador to the UN, Robert Wood, speaking to the UN last week.
As President Biden emphasized to the General Assembly, a diplomatic solution consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, remains the only path to durably reverse the cycle of escalation and to enable displaced people in both Israel and Lebanon to return to their homes.
Enforcing UN resolution 1701 which moves Hezbollah behind the Litany River (about 18 miles away from Israel) would be the easiest way to deescalate the situation. That 2006 resolution was unanimously approved by the UN security council, the Lebanese parliament, and Israeli government cabinet. Hezbollah also pledged to honor the call for a ceasefire. Heavy UN pressure for that resolution to be followed would deescalate the crisis.
The United Nations (UN) as an organization has limited authority, particularly in terms of enforcement capabilities. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is seen as the main decision-making body for international security and peacekeeping. However, the power dynamics within the UNSC are heavily influenced by the United States.
The United States wields significant power within the UNSC, with support from allies such as the United Kingdom and France. These two permanent members often align closely with U.S. policies, creating a powerful voting bloc. For instance, in 2011, the U.S., the UK, and France coordinated to pass UNSC Resolution 1973, which authorized military intervention in Libya, leading to the eventual overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. This intervention was seen as heavily Western-driven, with significant debate over whether it overstepped its original humanitarian mandate.
On the other hand, Russia and China, also permanent members with veto power, have typically acted cautiously, often preferring not to confront Western powers directly unless their core interests are threatened. For example, Russia and China have repeatedly used their veto power to block resolutions against the Syrian government due to their alliance with President Bashar al-Assad. Despite these vetoes, their actions have been largely defensive, focusing on preventing Western-led interventions rather than proposing alternative solutions or countering broader Western influence.
This power imbalance limits the UNSC's ability to function as a neutral or decisive force in many international crises. The ability of the United States to apply diplomatic pressure on the ten non-permanent members—countries that serve limited terms on the Council—further exacerbates this imbalance. For example, the U.S. has used its economic influence to gain the support of non-permanent members on critical votes, as seen in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The U.S. was able to secure key backing, although ultimately it did not gain full UNSC approval for the war, leading to a controversial "coalition of the willing."
As a result, the UNSC is often perceived as ineffective, particularly when addressing issues where major powers have conflicting interests. For instance, despite overwhelming global support for Palestinian statehood, the UNSC has been unable to pass meaningful resolutions to advance the peace process, largely due to U.S. vetoes in favor of Israel. The broader UN’s ability to take meaningful action is thus severely hampered by the Security Council’s deadlock, which impacts the organization’s overall effectiveness in maintaining international peace and security.
This state of affairs is not new; it has been a persistent feature of international politics since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. has demonstrated repeatedly that it can use its diplomatic and economic leverage to shape UNSC decisions, often avoiding accountability for actions that might otherwise face international scrutiny. A notable example is the protection afforded to Israel, where the U.S. has consistently vetoed resolutions condemning settlement activities or military actions, effectively shielding Israel from potential repercussions at the international level.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the main organ of the United Nation entrusted with the responsibility to maintain peace by force, by economic sanction and / or international military action, if necessary. As Israel's brutal war against Palestinians progressed, weak attempts have been made by some of the superpowers in the UNSC to provide some token respite to the Palestinians facing genocide in Gaza:
Russia and China vetoed a US-drafted resolution that called for “humanitarian pauses” and Israel’s right to defend itself. A second draft resolution sponsored by Russia, which called for a humanitarian ceasefire, failed to garner enough votes to pass. The United States was expected to veto the resolution had it garnered enough votes to put it on the path to approval. - How the US has used its veto power at the UN in support of Israel
The failure of the world community to take bold actions against the Israeli-right government has further bolstered them to prolong and enlarge the conflict by conducting military and intelligence operations in Lebanon and Iran. In response, Iran has already launched missile strikes against Israel, while the IDF has been given the go ahead for a land invasion in Lebanon.
As the situation continues to deteriorate, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (a harsh critic of Netanyahu and his right-wing ilk) has suggested that the world community in the UN should now ignore the the UNSC and consider invoking United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377 (V).
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 377 A, the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, states that in any cases where the Security Council, because of a lack of unanimity among its five permanent members (P5), fails to act as required to maintain international security and peace, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately and may issue appropriate recommendations to UN members for collective measures, including the use of armed force when necessary, in order to maintain or restore international security and peace.
This allows the United Nations General Assembly to convene an Emergency Special Session (if it is not already in session) that allows it to bypass the United Nations Security Council and sanction political and international military action against states like Israel, who are threatening world peace by waging war against other nations, disregarding the world community.
... To date, ten emergency special sessions have been convened. The first one took place on the occasion of the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt and the British-French attack on the Suez Canal zone; the tenth emergency special session, dealing with the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, started in 1997 and has not yet come to its end. (It was adjourned by resolution ES-10/16 of 17 November 2006, para. 13, and can at any time be resumed upon request by Member States.)
... Total emancipation from the Security Council is reached where the Secretary-General convenes an emergency special meeting at the request of a United Nations Member acting with the support of a majority in the General Assembly. The seventh emergency special session on Palestine (1980-1982) was in fact initiated by Senegal, the eighth emergency special session on Namibia (1981) goes back to a request by Zimbabwe, and the tenth emergency special session was solicited by Qatar as the Chair of the Group of Arab States at the United Nations. It stands to reason that in such instances the overwhelming weight of third world countries can manifest itself to its full extent.
But it would actually be used against the Security Council only in case of general dissatisfaction with the policies of the permanent members. Notwithstanding their sheer numerical superiority, the many Members of the United Nations are much too weak to attempt to challenge the decisions made at the Security Council. Any application of Uniting for Peace with a view to taking enforcement action would at least need the support of one of the permanent members ... To date, resolution 498 (V) of 1951 remains the only example of a situation where the General Assembly ... recommended taking such action, notwithstanding the firm resistance of a permanent member. - Uniting for Peace general Assembly resolution 377 (V)
The idea by Turkey, which has also once publicly threatened military action against Israel, has merits because it is public knowledge that the unnecessary bombing and slaughter of Palestinians by the Netanyahu's government has alienated Israel in the international community. Israel also doesn't have a good reputation in the United Nations because of its flagrant violations of human rights and international laws against the Palestinians, as the many UN resolutions against it highlight, which means it may not be able to diplomatically counter such a move. (And that's good, for peace).
