What is Netanyahu's exit strategy from the war in Gaza and Lebanon, and a potential confrontation with Iran?

Question

During Benjamin Netanyahu's recent speech at the UN, he spent the majority of his time reiterating the remarks he made about Israel's war on seven fronts, with no mention of any "practical" means to end the war in Gaza or a political vision for a post-war Gaza. Besides his speech being a political show, Netanyahu also ordered the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, a move that potentially brought the region to the brink of a major outbreak, as evidenced by the recent Iranian attack on Israel.

One could argue that Yahya Sinwar himself dreamed of such a regional war since October 7—one that would exhaust Israel’s socio-economic and military resources.

The key question here is: what is Netanyahu's exit strategy from this war and a potential confrontation with Iran?

Answer 1

TLDR

This answer cites war goals, announced by Netanyahu himself, about the Gaza operations: 1. deterrence, 3. eliminating the planners of 10/7, including Sinwar 3b. getting the hostages back, 4. removing Hamas from power, 5. destroy Hamas troops 6. maintaining an Israeli security presence.

Until those goals are downgraded, adjusted or negotiated away, this answer is that the strategy is to exit once enough of these goals have been achieved. A number of them have not and Netanyahu's rightwing coalition partners are on the record that they would drop their support in case of an early departure.

---

Well, we can infer some of Netanyahu's war aims from his statements about the current war, past positions, observing Israeli actions and comparing them to past Israeli strategies. Additionally, while we cannot "read his mind", Israel is a democracy and Netanyahu doesn't carry the final word a la Putin. He is both constrained in what he can realistically enlist support for from other members of the Israeli polity and has to communicate to other politicians, which are externally observable.

A year into this war, it's not unreasonable to ask what the plans are. This answer will mostly concentrate on Gaza as it seems more problematic long term than Iran/Lebanon.

1. Deterrence

This is a frequent word in the Israeli press. The word speaks for itself, it is meant to convince, by force, Gazans not to attack Israel. At a guess, this is probably achieved, for the time being: Hamas will lay low, for a while, if Israel leaves.

2. No Palestinian state, ever.

That has been Netanyahu's long term position and there are no indications he's changed it. Even for a different Israeli leader, selling such a state to the electorate would be difficult after 10/7.

3. Kill Sinwar, and the other 10/7 planners.

Sinwar was killed soon after I posted this answer, but this goal had already mostly been achieved when I wrote it, with a number of other high ranking Hamas leaders eliminated. See also.

3B. Get the hostages back.

They have worked at it, but it's also clear some of the other goals have taken precedence, for example removing Hamas.

4. Dislodge Hamas from power in Gaza and/or get the population to revolt. Get more amenable Palestinian leaders.

There have been talks for example of boosting the power of Gaza clans and families. Hamas has been vigilant in rooting dissent out however.

Direct Netanyahu, April 2024

Netanyahu on Tuesday also repeated his oft-stated war goals of eliminating Hamas, returning the hostages and ensuring that Gaza never again poses a threat to Israel.

“There is a fourth objective: Hamas is part of Iran’s axis of evil, which aims to destroy us. And when we defeat Hamas, it is not only defeating Hamas–it is defeating the axis."

5. Destroy Hamas combat brigades

IIRC Hamas started out with about 10 combat brigades and Israel has tried hard to reduce them. That was one of the reasons to attack the Khan Younis area, 4-5 months back, as the last 3 or 4 were lodged there.

The trouble with this approach is that while the IDF can, and has, smashed any organized resistance at a given location, it cannot pin them in place, destroy them, and control the terrain durably. Look around press coverage and you will quickly see articles of the IDF redeploying to areas they had cleared before. The tunnels (pooh poohed by some earlier) are probably a big help there.

Direct Netanyahu, April 2024

“We will complete the elimination of Hamas’s battalions, including in Rafah. No force in the world will stop us…. After what [Hamas] has done, it will not do this again. Neither will it exist"

6. Establish durable security control in Gaza to prevent future arms buildups.

Netanyahu has talked about keeping an IDF presence. That tends to be badly received by the Americans who would prefer Fatah. Something Netanyahu emphatically refuses. Fatah, for itself, has expressed extreme aversion to coming in on behalf of Israel.

(Direct Netanyahu) "I think Israel will, for an indefinite period, have the overall security responsibility, because we have seen what happens when we don't have it.

More recently, Netanyahu has been talking up keeping control of the Philadelphi corridor (the Gaza-Egypt border).

7. Perhaps most importantly, biding for time.

A number of the preceding goals are still elusive at this point and the situation in Gaza is far from brilliant. And Netanyahu has so far failed to articulate exactly what he considers "good enough" to stop.

But staying in Gaza is not existentially problematic to the IDF in the short term (it is bumping up the deficit). If the food blockage claims didn't cause a rupture with the West, continued lower intensity operations likely won't. Maybe something will turn things around? Maybe the rest of the hostages will be recovered? And there is always the possibility of having a much friendlier Trump presidency next year.

Stopping in Gaza now would risk looking like weakness and confirming failure. His hard right allies have stated they would drop their support, thus collapsing his government. The more moderate want his scalp for allowing 10/7 in the first place. Stopping would also force looking at providing reconstruction for what after all remains an Israeli-controlled region. Last, it would leave a power vacuum that Hamas would fill right back up.

It's like teaching a horse to sing: maybe something will take a turn for the better.

---

(A bit of opinion, which does IMHO illustrate some dilemmas facing Israel)

After 10/7, a number of these points would be understandable (at least, if one doesn't look too closely at the 41000 Gazan dead so far).

However #2, no Palestinian state, ever, gives Gazans very little reason to eschew armed resistance. Yes, at some point they may cease fighting on this current round. But either Israel will have to maintain a police presence to keep the peace or they will eventually rearm.

Gazans are on the whole a very young population, living under very harsh conditions. They can't leave and nearly everyone has had people close to them killed. At least some young men will keep on getting killed while trying to kill their enemies.

So the deterrence aspect, long term, is questionable, unless Israel is even more coercive, which may result in ever-dropping Western backing. While it is not that surprising to see European criticism, even the US, especially amongst younger generations has seen unprecedented criticism. Will it happen? Unsure, but it is a long term risk.

Still, short term, it'll probably be a long while before Hamas really puts forward a strong attack if/when the IDF leaves.

Make no mistake: this isn't a standard guerrilla war. It's a stalemate. Given the current situation, Israelis can't "go home", like the US did in Nam and Afghanistan, the Soviet in Afghanistan or the French in Algeria. That's something Hamas doesn't seem to get: they give the Israelis as little way out as Netanyahu does to Gazans and West Bankers. That and Hamas are terrorists, not just "resistance fighters".

What is certain at this point is that both populations are suffering from policies pursued by the other side's government and that this looks unlikely to change unless major shifts happen in their goals.

---

Lebanon and Iran - a more traditional campaign

Lebanon and Iran however seem like they would be more manageable.
The Lebanese don't have nearly as much skin in the game as the Gazans, the country is nearly a failed state and Hezbollah's adventures may come to be unappreciated by Sunnis and Christians. The IDF and Hezbollah slugged it out in 2006 and Israel did establish deterrence. So far, 2024 has started out way better for the IDF, but it's early days and there are supposedly still a lot of missiles.

Iran, as long as it is non-nuclear, is 1000km away, and has no air force that can realistically threaten Israel, though its missile force has the capacity to inflict some level of deliberate civilian casualties on Israel (lessened by widespread availability of bomb shelters and Iran's reliance on mostly long-prep liquid-fuelled IRBMs). Its government may want to sit out a full out fight, as it itself has its own problems and has regional rivals. Israel could certainly hurt it, though that will also be limited by distance. In any case, unlike with Gaza and the West Bank and even Lebanon, in the domain of public sympathy, Israel is much more likely to get the benefit of the doubt from Western nations when targeting Iran.

There are risks: ground invasions in Lebanon can bog down, whacking Lebanon too hard can backfire wrt world opinion (especially if the methods to do so are controversial) and Iron Dome defenses are susceptible to saturation attacks and cost asymmetries (I find it hard to believe, but the number of 150k rockets, before October, was claimed for Hezbollah). Iran can also threaten to disrupt the oil trade and that's probably one of its better points of leverage.

But, while it is way too early to have much confidence, the idea of successful deterrence seems more achievable wrt Lebanon and Iran. The IDF is very good at fighting conventional wars.

p.s. "exit strategy", as opposed to "goals" or "aims" seems the wrong term. An exit strategy is not the goal a country goes to war with, it is a what you consider to be your minimum results allowing you to leave, after your initial goals have clearly failed. The US was looking for an exit strategy in Vietnam and Afghanistan. The USSR in Afghanistan. Israel from South Lebanon in the 80s. Russia (or Ukraine) may look for one in the future.

Talking about an "exit strategy" with regards to Lebanon is quite premature given that the war there is less than a month old. Israel isn't at that stage at this point, even in Gaza.

Answer 2

what is Netanyahu's exit strategy from this war and a potential confrontation with Iran?

At first let's see how is the situation in the region. On one side, there is Israel,surrounded and constantly threatened from Syria, Lebanon and Gaza.On the other side, there are Iran and its proxies in Yemen, Iraq, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, what they call the axis of resistance.

Israel's main concerns are Hamas and Hezbollah, because they have common borders. One year after the October 7th attacks, Hamas doesn't exist as an organized group and Hezbollah has lost all of its leaders. There is no organized attack from Syria and Israel bombs the Iranian munitions every now and then in Syria, Yemen and Iraq are far away and the attacks launched from these countries haven't caused serious problems yet. But Israel's main problem is what it calls the head of Octopus: Iran, because Iran finances and organizes all other countries/groups and Israel's main concern is countering Iran because it can put an end to the malicious activity of all other proxy groups that have destabilized the region for years.

If the United States is dragged directly into a long-term conflict in the Middle East, what guarantees are there that Iran can be contained without subjecting U.S. military assets—such as airfields and barracks in Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar—to serious danger?

One can never predict the outcome of a war and everything about it is a speculation. But given that the situation in Iran is really unstable and the regime already struggles with constant demonstrations and protests, it seems that the regime cannot withstand a long war. In 2021 and during Mahsa Amini protests, there were demonstrations in more than 150 cities in all Iranian provinces. It shows that the regime has lost the legitimacy inside Iran and it cannot manage a war. Finally, the Islamic Republic doesn't have a strong conventional army(because of sanctions), and that's why it has created many proxy groups. Now that its most powerful proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, are weakened considerably, the regime is really vulnerable and any direct confrontation with a foreign country can have serious consequences.

Answer 3

What is Netanyahu betting on?

Total victory as he keeps saying. The rest is probably difficult to answer without speculation, like e.g. Trump wins and gives Bibi a much freer hand. For example Trump already said he supports the bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities.

You can read an IDF's chief statement here, how confident they are of victory.

A year has passed, and we have defeated the military wing of Hamas, and we continue to fight against the organization’s terrorist capabilities; We have dealt a severe blow to Hezbollah, which has lost all of its senior leadership. We are not stopping – we fight, debrief, learn, and improve. We are taking an offensive, tactical, and proactive approach on all fronts, adapting our defensive strategies on all borders, and understanding that the IDF must be a greater army that takes good care of its people. We are destroying our enemies’ capabilities, and we will ensure that these capabilities are not rebuilt, so that October 7th is never repeated.

As for the war aims, those are briefly summarized/recalled as:

Many challenges still lie ahead in achieving the war’s objectives – defeating the enemy, returning the hostages – an urgent mission of the highest moral value – and returning the civilians to their homes.

---

what guarantees

There are no guarantees in war but the destruction of your enemies. Israel is fighting a '100 year war'. Only nukes could perhaps end it quickly. (See Japan '45. Netanyahu, BTW, relishes on historical comparisons with WW2 now and then.)

Now to be more charitable to Netanyahu, he does seem to be betting on regime change in Iran, at least at a rhetorical level. Through what shocks he plans to achieve that, it remains to be seen.

“When Iran is finally free, and that moment will come a lot sooner than people think — everything will be different,” Netanyahu said in a video statement addressed to Iranians, in which he lambasted the "fanatic theocrats" who rule the country.

One possibility is that Iran will somehow move towards a more Western democratic/aligned model. Another is that it would sink into a civil war. Either case would benefit Israel. Some of the opposition was definitely Kurdish inspired to some extent. Relatedly, Netanyahu endorsed the Kurdish independence referendum in neighboring Iraq, in 2017.

There were also older protests in Iran over fuel prices. This year, Israel has struck the fuel terminals and storage of the Houthis. Should Iranian supply be affected by some Israeli strikes, perhaps such protests can reignite. (Yeah, the US administration and even some Gulf states recently said they oppose strikes on Iran's oil. But their word doesn't always convince Netanyahu.)

---

On the Lebanese front as such, I think we don't have a lot of clarity what the objectives are beyond slogans and degrading Hezbollah. Reportedly there have been discussions to establish another buffer zone, but nothing's been decided yet, and as some commenter said, that's been tried before ultimately not successfully.

the region has seen a significant departure of civilians from southern Lebanese villages. Estimates suggest that only about 20% of the pre-October 7 population remains in the area. This substantial decrease in civilian presence would allow the IDF to execute the proposed maneuver more efficiently and rapidly.

[...] Additionally, it aims to create leverage for negotiating a lasting settlement, as Hezbollah would likely be motivated to reach an agreement to prompt an IDF withdrawal.

[...] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated during recent strategic discussions that the IDF should prepare for an expanded northern campaign.

The IDF, BTW, has ordered/advised the civilian population to move north of the Awali river, which is even farther north of the Litani (of the fabled 1701 UN resolution).

It seems that Netanyahu will not be content with a mere withdrawal of Hezbollah from the border at this point, but wants them completely gone from Lebanon as a precondition for the war to stop.

During a video address directed at the people of Lebanon, Netanyahu said: "You have an opportunity to save Lebanon before it falls into the abyss of a long war that will lead to destruction and suffering like we see in Gaza.

"I say to you, the people of Lebanon: Free your country from Hezbollah so that this war can end."

Likewise the Israeli commanders on the field said they will "not leave two stones on top of each other in any house that weapons were in".

On their side, Hezbollah appears to be backpedalling from their support of Hamas, by no longer mentioning ceasefire in Gaza as related to a ceasefire in Lebanon in the past few days/declarations, but they've not explicitly dropped that point (that was their main justification for starting their attacks around October '23). Still, they're not even willing to concede to withdraw from the border area, at least publicly, which is a core/older demand of the Israeli government on that front.

One anonymous Israeli official noted in a nutshell:

We are currently in a position of power, a ceasefire will be on our terms.

Netanyahu has experienced a noticeable boost/recovery in popularity in Israel as a result of the recent battlefield successes, so that might also shape his approach/endgame.

---

OTOH:

Hours before Israel struck Iran over the weekend, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant sent a harshly-worded missive to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warning that Israel’s war efforts had become aimless and needed to be refocused given regional developments in the past year, Hebrew media reported Sunday.

News of the letter, reportedly also sent to most cabinet ministers and top officials from the military, Mossad spy agency and Shin Bet security service, came as a report emerged that Netanyahu had promised political allies he would jettison Gallant once Israel attacked Iran.

In the communique, Gallant argued that Israel was fighting according to an “outdated compass” and that Jerusalem to revise its official war aims initially set following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, according to Channel 13 news.

“Significant developments in the war, especially Israel and Iran trading direct blows, raise the necessity of holding a discussion and updating the war’s goals with a comprehensive look” at the areas of fighting and the interconnections between them, Gallant reportedly wrote.

So it's not like there aren't any divergences in the present cabinet regarding the war strategy/aims. Also recall Smotrich's and Ben Gvir's various red lines, e.g. retaining the Philadelphi corridor.

Netanyahu’s office called Gallant’s letter “bizarre” in a response to Channel 13. “There is a single compass, and that is the war aims as determined by the cabinet,” said the office. “They are examined all the time, and have even been recently expanded,” it added.

So, it's an ongoing process to expand the war goals.

---

As for the Israeli Gaza future governance plan, it seem it's secret for now, or at least it was still so in June:

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged the challenges last week, saying in an interview with the right-wing Channel 14 network that the Defense Ministry had already made attempts to reach out to Gaza clans but “Hamas eliminated” them.

He said the Defense Ministry had a new plan, but would not give details other than specifying he was not willing to bring in the Palestinian Authority, which currently governs the West Bank. [...]

Israel has yet to develop a concrete postwar plan for governance and security in the enclave, said the [US] officials, who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.

Answer 4

Allegedly, Netanyahu has no exit strategy (as of time of writing), or at least if he has such a strategy he has not made it public.

Source

The phrase that's being used by the Israeli government and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is that they want to achieve "total victory." What this means in practice, though, is up for interpretation and many believe the Israeli government has itself not fully spelled out a definition.

...

But there is still no news from the Israeli government as to its long-term plan regarding the war and its outcome.

The United States, Israel's closest ally, has also called on Netanyahu to provide clarity on the future. In May, after a trip to Israel to meet with Netanyahu, Israeli President Isaac Herzog and other government officials, US national security adviser Jake Sullivan said he had "reaffirmed the need for Israel to connect its military operations to a political strategy that can ensure the lasting defeat of Hamas, the release of all the hostages, and a better future for Gaza."

The source goes on to say that part of the problem is that Israel itself suffers from deep divisions, with more extreme parties wanting to expand Israeli occupation of the West Bank or even the Gaza Strip, while more moderate parties want a spectrum of other possible end states. Netanyahu is after all an elected leader; he is constrained by his electorate.

Answer 5

"What is Netanyahu betting on?"

Netanyahu is betting on unwavering support from Zionist lobbies in Western nations, particularly in the United States.

"...that would exhaust Israel's socio-economic and military background."

It is unlikely that Israel will face significant exhaustion in the immediate term, given the strong backing from the United States and its allied partners. As long as substantial political, military, and economic support continues to flow, Israel’s socio-economic resilience and military capabilities will remain intact.

"What is Netanyahu's exit strategy from this war?"

Netanyahu appears to lack a definitive exit strategy, and frankly, he might not see the necessity for one. Historical precedent suggests that leaders seldom face personal consequences for prolonged military conflicts once they eventually step down. No American president faced accountability for the Vietnam War, nor were George W. Bush or Tony Blair held responsible for the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions. The absence of repercussions allows leaders like Netanyahu to adopt a wait-and-see approach, letting the conflict drag on while they consolidate political power. Thus, maintaining the status quo appears to be his only plausible exit strategy, one in which he can rely on the inertia of ongoing support from key allies.

Another factor driving Netanyahu's lack of a clear exit strategy is his immediate political concerns. Domestic politics heavily influence his decisions—he must maintain an image of strength to placate his right-wing base and fend off opposition. Any concession or visible retreat risks weakening his political standing.

"...and a potential trade of blows with Iran?"

When it comes to the possibility of a confrontation with Iran, both Israel and Iran appear to have no interest in pursuing a full-scale war. Iran, while assertive, has generally preferred indirect engagement, often using proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and various militia groups across Iraq and Syria. Israel, on the other hand, is well aware of the costs of direct conflict, particularly one involving Iran’s extensive military capabilities. Therefore, a large-scale confrontation is unlikely, with both sides instead relying on limited engagements—missile strikes, targeted attacks, and diplomatic posturing—while trying to avoid uncontrollable escalation.

For Israel, the immediate concern with Iran is not a direct invasion but rather the regional influence Tehran exercises through its proxy network. The pattern of limited skirmishes—such as Israel's strikes against Iranian assets in Syria—suggests that Netanyahu's strategy is to continue weakening Iran’s regional infrastructure while maintaining the upper hand in the event of a tit-for-tat exchange. This approach does not necessitate an "exit strategy" so much as a continuation of containment and deterrence, with no defined endpoint.

The situation in Lebanon also follows a similar logic. While Hezbollah remains a significant threat, it is one that Israel believes can be contained through deterrence. The historical precedent here is Israel’s 2006 war with Hezbollah, which, while costly, did not escalate into an unmanageable conflict. Netanyahu may be betting that any escalation with Hezbollah can similarly be contained without spiraling into a broader, existential confrontation.

"If the United States is going to be dragged directly into a long-term war in the Middle East, what guarantees that it can contain Iran and avoid subjecting U.S. military assets (airfields, barracks) in Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar to serious danger?"

The United States will likely avoid direct confrontation with Iran, recognizing that containing Iran through military force alone is both impractical and dangerous. Iran’s significant military capabilities, particularly its influence through regional proxies, make it a formidable adversary in a direct confrontation. The U.S. previously attempted to counter Iran by backing Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, which ended in a costly stalemate after eight years. Since then, Iran has only expanded its military power and regional influence, making direct confrontation an even less attractive option today.

Gulf states that previously supported the United States in its confrontations with Iran have also changed their stance. The shifting power dynamics in the Middle East have led these nations to recognize Iran’s growing influence and capabilities, prompting a more cautious approach. Recent diplomatic engagements between Iran and Saudi Arabia, facilitated by China, highlight the changing dynamics in the region and the desire among Gulf states to de-escalate tensions rather than align themselves with a U.S. military campaign.

Additionally, U.S. military assets across Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar are well within the range of Iran’s missile capabilities. The January 2020 Iranian missile strikes on the Ain al-Asad airbase in Iraq, in retaliation for the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani, demonstrated Iran’s ability and willingness to target U.S. assets. The calculated nature of that response—intended to signal strength while avoiding a broader war—illustrates how precarious any direct confrontation with Iran could be.

Answer 6

Many in Iran believe he thinks of nothing but a strict victory, as that is the only way that he can remain in power and will not be sentenced to prison. This requires him to postpone any peace negotiation to after the US election, in the hope that maybe Trump will win and US will help him more effective. This is perhaps why he refuses to accept any peace agreement, as reaching to an agreement will be a shot in the foot, as that would help Harris campaign in front of Trump's. So all that he does is to buy time, and to wait in the hope that something good will happen. [This is what a politician proposed several weeks before, so it does not include the incidents that happened through the past few weeks, some of them being justifiable only as a matter of fighting for remaining in Power till US election, and others fighting for existence of Israel altogether.]

Answer 7

Question:

What is Netanyahu's exit strategy from the war in Gaza and Lebanon, and a potential confrontation with Iran?

Netanyahu's approach to the conflict in Gaza, Lebanon, and a potential confrontation with Iran is complicated by his political survival and long-standing security challenges. His strategy seems to involve aggressively neutralizing what Israel perceives as threats, including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran's influence across the region. By doing so, he may be aiming to bolster his domestic standing and political legacy, particularly after the devastating events of October 7, 2023.

His hope could be that, after weakening or eliminating these adversaries, Israel will gain a more secure regional position. Netanyahu might be betting that the Israeli public, still reeling from recent violence, will view him as a protector and allow him to weather criticism of his leadership, especially regarding the intelligence failures leading up to the attacks. He may also be counting on the international community eventually tolerating Israel’s actions once the fighting stops, in the interest of stability.

However, this strategy carries immense risks. The humanitarian cost and widespread destruction in Gaza have triggered calls for Israel to halt its military actions, including from some of its closest allies. If Israel continues to be seen as committing disproportionate violence, or even genocide, it risks becoming a pariah on the global stage. This would severely strain its relationships with key partners, such as the U.S. and European nations, whose support is vital for Israel's economic and military security.

Netanyahu’s path forward appears to hinge on whether the Israeli government can balance its military objectives with the long-term diplomatic and economic consequences of alienating the international community. Israel’s survival and prosperity are deeply interconnected with its global standing, and further isolation could undermine its long-term security and economic stability.